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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the leadership, organizational 
base and ideology of the New Right and analyzes its 
rapid rise to political prominence in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The New Right’s impact on American 
electoral politics is also probed through studying 
its role in the 1980 and 1982 elections.
It is argued that it is its political pragmatism, 
coupled with its emphasis on social issues which most 
distinguishes the New Right from the ’’old Right."
While economic conservatism and anticommunism have 
not diminished in importance for the New Right, it is 
its social conservatism which most defines the New 
Right outlook.
By bringing together the constituencies of 
the anti-abortion, anti-gay, anti-ERA and pro-school 
prayer groups, the New Right was able to broaden its 
base of support and reach sectors of the population 
not attracted to older right-wing movements. The 
New Right gave leadership to, and drew together into 
a "pro-family" coalition, these single-issue groups 
that arose in the 1970s, many of which represent the 
backlash against the political and cultural radicalism 
of the 1960s.
In the Conclusion, some of the weaknesses as 
well as the strengths of modern Sociology’s understanding 
of right-wing movements are pointed out. It is argued 
that where liberal Sociology is lacking, feminist 
theory offers an analysis that better provides an 
understanding of the centrality of the politics of 
family, sexuality, and reproduction to the New Right’s 
ideology and political program.
THE NEW RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
When Ronald Reagan was elected to the Presidency 
in 1980 and the Republican Party— for the first time in 
twenty-six years— gained control of the Senate, New 
Right leaders confidently claimed that conservatism had 
come of age. Gary Jarmin, Washington director of the 
Christian Voice/Moral Government Fund (which contributed 
money to several winning candidates) said that the 
election wave "points to the beginning of a new era." 
(Ellerin, 1981:55) New Right direct-mail wizard Richard 
Viguerie said, "The simple truth is that there is a new 
majority in America— and itTs being led by the New Right." 
(Viguerie, 1981:4) John "Terry" Dolan, Chairperson of 
the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) 
said, "The 1980 election gave the conservative movement 
the most massive political victory in its history." 
(Conservative Digest, 11/80:7)
With the conservative victory in 1980, the New Right 
also had come of age. As early as 1977., the former 
executive director of the Republican National Committee 
commented on the political strength of the New Right:
"If you ranked political institutions in this country, 
organized labor would be first, the Democratic Party would 
be second, the Republican Party is third. The Viguerie
2.
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network is unquestionably fourth." (Conservative Digest, 
6/77:12) The "Viguerie network" refers to the New Right 
apparatus. By 1980 the New Right had proved itself to 
be a major political force in American politics. And by 
1980, "moral majority"— which is now used as a shorthand 
term for the whole religious Right— had become a household 
word.
Conservative Alan Crawford (former aide to Senator
James Buckley and former assistant editor of Conservative
Digest) offers an "insider’s" account of the New Right in
his book,, Thunder on the Right (1980) . He describes it as
an institutionalized, disciplined, well-organized, and
well-financed movement which capitalizes on the passions
behind single-issue causes. The New Right, he says,
feeds on discontent, anger, insecurity and 
resentment and flourishes on backlash 
politics. Through its interlocking network 
it seeks to veto whatever it perceives to 
threaten its way of life— busing, women’s 
liberation, gay rights, pornography, loss 
of the Panama Canal— and promotes a beefed- 
up defense budget, lower taxes, and reduced 
federal regulation of small business.
(Crawford, 1980:5)
Crawford views the New Right as a political movement which
has already proved its potential as a political force to
be taken seriously in that it has
already reshaped, in significant ways, the 
face of Congress, stalled legislation in 
its tracks, and pushed through initiative and 
referenda. It has its eye on the presidency 
in coming years, vowing, as one New Right
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leader told me, ’to take control of the 
culture.’ Unlike right-wing zealots 
of the recent past, the New Right has 
built the organizational structure to make 
good that promise. (Crawford, 1980:4)
In his introduction to Richard Viguerie’s book,
The New Right: W e ’re Ready to Lead (1981) Moral Majority's
leader, Jerry Falwell, describes those people who make up
the New Right:
Mr. Viguerie uses the term the 'New Right' to 
speak of those moral citizens who now must 
come together to let their voices be heard, 
those he has described as the backbone of 
our country - those citizens who are pro-family, 
pro-moral, pro-life and pro-American, who 
have integrity and believe in hard work, those 
who pledge allegiance to the flag and proudly 
sing our national anthem. (Viguerie, 1981: 
Introduction)
Conservative Kevin Phillips, who first coined the
term "New Right" in the mid-70s, contends that the basic
premise behind the New Right is the idea that the present
two-party system is not effective and that the federal
government does not represent "the people." A new
conservative coalition which would join conservative
Democrats, Republicans and Independents, he maintained,
was needed to:
displace the existing governmental elite 
and restore fiscal responsibility, military 
preparedness, global purpose and a more 
family-church-neighborhood-oriented culture. 
(Conservative Digest, 3/79:21)
Allen Hunter, in the leftist journal Radical America, 
describes New Right ideology as an expression of a 
political and cultural backlash against the social
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movements and liberal policies of the 1960s. New Right
ideology, he says,
is a defense of the male-headed family 
against its alternatives; of America against 
its external and internal enemies; of 
capitalist free enterprise against its 
socialist and welfare-state alternatives.
It is a defense of hard work and virtue 
against moral lassitude and sexual freedom, 
of whites against blacks, of men against women, 
of parents against children. It is a politics 
that seeks to regain control of America for 
the white middle strata of America, Tthe 
people' who felt they were bypassed and put 
down by the changes of the 1960s.
(Hunter, 1981:113-14)
This paper will describe the rise of the New Right.
I will identify its leadership and discuss its organizational 
base and its ideology. I will argue that the New Right's 
pragmatism (coupled with its organizational base and 
resources), and its emphasis on social issues, distinguish 
it from the "old" Right. I will detail the New Right's 
"pro-family movement." I will focus on the pro-family 
movement because: a) it is its focus on social issues,
particularly family and sex-related issues, which makes 
the New Right new; b) the pro-family movement played a
significant role in the New Right's rise to political 
prominence, and c) it was through the pro-family coalition 
that the secular Right and the religious Right established 
a working relationship. Finally, after describing the New 
Right's perceived setback at the polls in 1982, I will 
discuss its present articulation of a "new populism" politics.
CHAPTER I 
THE NEW RIGHT
Ronald Reagan, writes New Right columnist William
Rusher, did not "spring full-blown from the brow of Jove
in 1980...and the conservative movement whose triumph he
symbolizes has been around for quite awhile." (Rusher, 1982:3)
The origins of the New Right can be traced back to the
1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater. "The seeds
of the contemporary New Right," says Paul Weyrich "were
sown by the Goldwater campaign. Most of us can, in our
personal histories, mark that campaign as the beginning
of the motivation that has never left us." (Weyrich, 1982:51)
The Goldwater campaign introduced the conservatives of
America to one another. But the New Right goes back even
further: it has roots in the conservative movement of the
1950s which arose in response to, says Rusher,
(1) the enormous expansion of the federal 
government in and after Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration, and (2) the emergence of 
world Communism as America’s principal 
international enemy in the years following 
World War II. (Rusher, 1982:5)
It was not until after 1974, after Watergate, that 
the New Right - as it is known today - took on organizational 
coherence. Four men - Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich,
Howard Phillips and John "Terry" Dolan - each of whom
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control a core organization, laid the organizational 
foundation for the New Right movement. Disappointed with 
both Nixon and Ford (whom they felt were "moderate" 
Republicans rather than true conservatives), they believed 
that one of the main problems conservatives had in 
building and organizing a political movement was the lack 
of strong leadership. Unlike the Left, which they felt 
had consistently had congressional leadership over the 
past two decades (in the persons of Birch Bayh, George 
McGovern, Frank Church, Edward Kennedy, for instance), 
they viewed the Right as lacking in both congressional 
leadership and in viable political organizations.
"Goldwater had provided some leadership in the early 1960s 
as had Strom Thurmond and a few others in isolated 
instances. But by the late 1960s there was no such leader. 
(Weyrich, 1982:59) A few men stepped in to fill the 
leadership vacuum, and the New Right was born. As Richard 
Viguerie, one of those men, describes it: "I decided to
stop following and start doing some leading of my own." 
(Viguerie, 1981:51)
Viguerie details the inception of the New Right.
In August, 197^3 upon hearing that then-President Gerald 
Ford had selected Nelson Rockefeller to be his Vice- 
President, Viguerie contacted about fourteen conservative 
friends to meet at his house. They met to discuss how 
they could stop Rockefeller— whom they considered to be a 
"high-flying, wild-spending leader of the Eastern liberal
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establishment"— from becoming Vice-President.
(Viguerie, 1981:5) Viguerie commented:
For many of us it was the last straw.
More than that, it was a revelation. It 
taught us that our very loyalty to the 
Republican Party had made us powerless— - 
even within the Party. The only way 
for conservatives to have influence, 
or to bring pressure on the Republican 
Party in the future, was to declare 
our independence. (Viguerie, 1982:28)
Although they were not successful in stopping Rockefeller,
they were on their way to forming the organizations
necessary to launch and keep afloat a political movement.
(Weyrich, 1982:59) "The more we talked and worked and
planned together", explained Viguerie, "the more we
realized we could make... important things happen. We
learned together and we helped educate each other about
movement building." (Viguerie, 1981:53)
New Right Leadership/The "Big Four" and their Organizations
The New Right...is so tight-knit...that 
any diagram of it looks like an octopus 
trying to shake hands with itself, so 
completely interlocked are the 
directorates of its various components.
Basically, however, the movement can 
almost be understood by a glance at its 
unofficial politboro, which consists of 
four men and a couple of computers.
(Davis, 1980:21)
The four men Davis refers to, as already mentioned, are:
Richard Viguerie, Howard Phillips, Paul Weyrich and John
"Terry" Dolan. These four men, who make up the core of
the New Right leadership, do not hold elective office.
Instead, they run various ideological groups, publish
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magazines and newsletters, operate political action 
committees and control major direct mail and fundraising 
organizations. While there are other significant 
leaders, these four men, writes Alan Crawford, are the 
self-appointed, "real" leaders, with New Right elected 
officials being "followers out front." (Crawford, 1980:269)
Richard Viguerie
Widely recognized as a fund-raising genius,
Viguerie was active in Senator John Tower’s (Republican-
Texas) political campaign in I960 and was executive
secretary of Young Americans for Freedom during the 1960s.
His two political heroes during college, he says, were
"the two Macs"— Douglas MacArthur and Joseph McCarthy.
Uncomfortable with asking people directly for money
for conservative causes, he started using the direct mail
approach and had such success that by 1965 he founded his
own direct mail company. (Viguerie, 1981:23-32) The
Richard A. Viguerie Company (RAVCO) claims to have on
computer the names of ten to twenty million conservative
donors, distributes more than two million pieces of mail
a week, and has raised millions of dollars for New Right
causes and candidates. (Ellerin, 1981:57) Columnist
Mary McGrory, in 1977, said of Viguerie and his direct
mail empire:
The firebase of the enemies of the Panama 
Canal treaty is the modern Falls Church 
office of Richard A. Viguerie, from which 
2 million anti-treaty letters will have
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been mailed by the end of this week.
He can stuff Capitol Hill mailboxes 
to overflowing in short order. On 
one quick job for the Committee for 
the Survival of a Free Congress* he 
flooded Senate offices with 600*000 
letters against the nomination of 
Paul Warnke as arms negotiator— and 
helped rally 40 negative votes.
He did a mailing of 500*000 against 
public financing of congressional 
campaigns* which went down in the 
Senate* for the National Conservative 
Political Action Committee* and one of 
two million against repeal of the 
Hatch Act* which is stalled in 
committee* for the Americans Against 
Union Control of Government.
(Washington Star* 9/27/77)
Viguerie* who is sometimes called the "Godfather” 
of the New Right* also owns Viguerie Communications 
Corporation which includes such publications as 
Conservative Digest* the monthly New Right magazine* 
and The New Right Report* a biweekly newsletter. He has 
also produced ’’The SALT Syndrome"— a television film 
which'featured Senator Jesse Helms and other Congressional 
leaders opposed to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaties. (Ellerin* 1981:57)
A key factor in the growth of Viguerie’s direct- 
mail empire was Watergate* which produced the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1974— a campaign finance reform 
enacted by Congress* which limited personal contributions 
to $1*000 per candidate per election. (Viguerie* 1981:37) 
These reforms— their stated purpose being to limit the 
amount of money spent by individual presidential
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candidates— simply shifted the source of money. The role
of the "fat cats" was reduced* "but the power of a tiny
number of technicians who have learned to raise small
amounts of money from large numbers of contributors was
vastly increased." (Crawford* 1980:44) And Viguerie is
the acknowledged expert at reaching large numbers of
supporters for contributions.
Viguerie* in addition* is active in numerous
other New Right organizations. Says Crawford*
He sometimes exercises great control over 
the political organizations with which he 
is associated. The consolidation of 
that control goes far to account for the growth 
and influence of the New Right. (Crawford*
1980:43)
Paul Weyrich
According to Viguerie* Paul Weyrich "may be the 
single most important conservative in America today." 
(Conservative Digest* 8/78:48) He is acknowledged by 
political observers on the Left as well as the Right as 
being one of the shrewdest politicians in the nation. 
(Conservative Digest* 7/81:2)
Weyrich formed the Committee for the Survival 
of a Free Congress in 1974* which provides funds for 
New Right candidates and does cadre training and 
specializes in developing organizations at the precinct 
level. It also serves as a focal point for conservative 
lobbying on Capitol Hill and is an important information 
resource for the conservative movement. In the 1978
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election* the Committee for the Survival of a Free 
Congress came of age* helping to elect 38 conservative 
candidates* including Senators Gordon Humphrey* Roger 
Jepsen* Bill Armstrong and John Warner. The Committee 
gives not only money* but even more importantly (in 
Weyrich1s opinion)* technical assistance and advice. 
Weyrich has adopted the "Fasten Plan"— named after 
Senator Kasten of Wisconsin— as the core of his training 
sessions and schools. In the Kasten Plan* a specific 
voter turnout goal is set for every precinct in a 
congressional district. The precinct chairperson is given 
the responsibility of meeting that goal. (Conservative 
Digest * 7/81:4) In order to win the Committee’s 
endorsement* the candidate has to answer a 72-item 
questionnaire to determine whether the candidate is a 
"real conservative." They Weyrich and the Committee 
decide whether to lend the Committee’s helping hand.
Simply because they support a candidate’s politics does 
not mean they will lend their assistance. Explains 
Weyrich:
Obviously if he is going to win without 
our assistance* we don’t need to spend 
any money on him. And if his race is 
hopeless* there’s no point in spending 
any. What we are looking for are races 
where we can make a difference.
(Conservative Digest* 7/81:5)
In 1980* 59 percent of the Committee for the
Survival of a Free Congress’ funds went into winning
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campaigns. That year the Committee team trained an 
estimated 7,000 volunteers for Moral Majority* Phyllis 
Schlafly’s Eagles* the Right to Life Movement* and people 
involved with Right to Work* national defense and other 
conservative groups. (Conservative Digest* 7/81:6)
With financial assistance from brewer Joseph Coors* 
Weyrich founded and was first president of the Heritage 
Foundation* the New Right’s think tank. After the 1980 
election* the Heritage Foundation presented Reagan with 
a 20-volume study which recommended such measures as the 
re-establishment of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee and the Internal Security Committee of the 
McCarthy period. It also recommended economic and military 
support to right-wing military governments in Latin 
America* a reduced emphasis on human rights as the basis 
for United States foreign policy* and the elimination of 
affirmative action programs. (Hall* 1981:5)
Weyrich is also president of the Free Congress 
Research and Education Foundation* started in 1978* 
which has provided intellectual leadership in the pro- 
family movement* coalition politics and the religious 
Right. He also heads the Coalitions for America* which 
through its three divisions— the Kingston Group* the 
Library Court Group and the Stanton Group— serves as a 
central forum for nearly 120 different conservative 
organizations concerned with domestic policy and economics, 
pro-family issues and national defense and international
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affairs. (Conservative Digest* 7/81:2) In addition*
Weyrich has founded or played the critical role in other 
conservative groups such as the American Legislative 
Exchange Council* the Republican Study Committee and the 
Senate Steering Committee.
"I can think of no one"* assesses Viguerie* "who 
better symbolizes or is more important to the conservative 
movement than Paul Weyrich." He is the man with the 
"broadest vision" for the New Right* considered to be the 
best strategist and coordinator of the New Right’s develop­
ment. (Viguerie* 1981:53) Weyrich can be found
thinking up legislative strategy...holding 
meetings with wavering members of Congress... 
cleverly recruiting new allies into the 
fight...suggesting the right leader to 
take charge of the battle on the floors 
of both houses of Congress... providing key 
arguments to the right journalists...and* 
in general* taking a heavy burden of the 
battle on his shoulders. (Conservative 
Digest * 8/78:48)
While intimately involved in the full range of New Right
political activities* Weyrich’s greatest asset* according
to Viguerie* is his ability to see the interrelations of
all New Right activities and his ability to help
"orchestrate conservative activity on all fronts."
(Conservative Digest* 8/78:4)
Weyrich was the one who initially perceived the
importance of the pro-family social issues and the
political potential of fundamentalist Protestantism.
(Hunter* 1981:118) Weyrich* believing that family issues
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would constitute the major political background of the
1980s* has "become a master" at persuading pro-family
groups to join the conservative coalition. (Conservative
Digest * 6/79:14) He believes family-oriented concerns
to be the wave of the future for conservatives. He argues
that millions of Americans have been politically awakened
by such social issues as voluntary prayer in the school*
abortion* and "liberal" legislation such as the Domestic
Violence Bill. He says*
As pro-family groups become better educated 
in the political process* a lot of congress­
men who today thumb their noses at the whole 
notion of a pro-family coalition are going 
to be humbled. (Conservative Digest* 7/81:8)
Howard Phillips
"What Paul Weyrich is to the conservative movement 
in Washington" says Viguerie* "Howard Phillips is to the 
grass-roots movement around the country." (Viguerie* 1981: 
58) Phillips* also a graduate of Young Americans for 
Freedom* was brought into the Nixon Administration to 
abolish the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) and its 
programs; however* as "Richard Nixon became more and more 
preoccupied with Watergate* liberal White House staffers 
decided 0E0 dismantlement was too controversial."
(Viguerie* 1981:51) Disillusioned with Nixon* Phillips 
went on to found Conservative Caucus.
With the aid of Viguerie1s mailing lists* Phillips 
founded and is national director of the Conservative Caucus*
16.
which mobilizes constituents to put pressure on members
of Congress* and provides the leadership to mobilize
grassroots sentiment and action. Phillips recognizes the
political strength of the Conservative Caucus through
its work at the grassroots level* in the communities where
people live. He says*
We have three basic jobs: to recruit and 
train local leaders* to lobby at the 
grassroots level* and to help set the 
agenda for national debate, by emphasizing 
the conservative viewpoint on key issues.
If we fight only at the national level* we 
lose. But using our strength at the local 
level* at the grassroots, we can win.
(Viguerie* 1981:58)
Phillips believes that being able to determine the 
issues is where lies the power and strength of a 
movement. Defining power as "the ability to tell others 
what the issues are* what the issues mean* and who the 
good guys and the bad guys are*" Phillips says that 
conservatives have to "put themselves in the position 
where they can choose the grounds for conflict." 
(Conservative Digest* 3/80:11) For example* he noted that 
the 1974 election became a referendum on Watergate* to 
the disadvantage of conservatives* and was used to 
"defuse the rising conservative tide in America." 
(Conservative Digest* 3/80:10)
Phillips believes that for too long conservatives 
tried to wage their battle in Washington* where the 
liberals were most influential. "We have to build 
political mechanisms in the grassroots. We need a local
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power structure for conservatives* to contend with the 
Washington power structure of the liberals." (Conservative 
Digest * 9/75:11) Conservatives should mobilize their 
assets by "fighting a guerrilla conflict at the congress­
ional district level" rather than by "fighting a pitched 
battle with liberals on their terrain in Washington." 
(Conservative Digest* 3/80:11) He believes that Congress 
is the crucial arena of struggle for conservatives.
If we can get two-thirds in both houses 
of Congress* we cannot be stopped. With 
control of Congress* we could limit the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court if we 
wanted to. We can abolish inferior 
courts. We can eliminate the Department 
of Health* Education and Welfare. Congress 
can control what the bureaucracy does.
Congress can control what the courts do.
Whether it be foreign policy* domestic 
policy* economic or social policy*
Congress is the key. (Conservative Digest*
3/80:11)
The philosophy behind the Caucus is to bring 
together social and economic conservatives at a level 
where pressure can be brought on individual congresspeople. 
A byproduct of this philosophy is that the Caucus is a 
natural breeding ground for future political leaders.
Gordon Humphrey started his political career* for example* 
as New Hampshire State Coordinator for the Caucus. 
(Conservative Digest* 6/79:15)
Phillips also worked with Weyrich in setting up 
Moral Majority. The only answer for America* he told 
Alan Crawford* is to "resort to Biblical law."
(Crawford* 1980:271)
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John "Terry" Dolan
Dolan heads the National Conservative Political 
Action Committee (NCPAC)* which was founded in 1974.
The largest conservative PAC* it distributed over $2.3 
million in cash and in-kind contributions to political 
campaigns in 1980. It also spends millions of dollars 
in other areas such as advertising to elect conservatives. 
(Viguerie* 1981:56)
NCPAC* under Dolan’s direction* came to be known 
for its training seminars for both candidates and campaign 
personnel on ways to set up a campaign structure and for its 
high-quality campaign services. The successful campaign 
of Gordon Humphrey (Republican - New Hampshire)* for 
instance* was built around trainees from these seminars.
He and other conservative leaders such as Senator Orrin 
Hatch* and Representatives Robert Dornan and Philip 
Crane have termed NCPACTs aid invaluable and said they 
would not be in Congress without the organization’s help.
(Crotty* 1980:147; Conservative Digest* 12/80:2)
NCPAC was described by the Congressional Quarterly 
as the "most effective" of the conservative organizations 
in 1976 when 67% of the candidates it supported were elected.
In 1978* 71% of its candidates won. (Conservative Digest* 1/79:26) 
During the 1980 elections* NCPAC’s "Target 80" program was 
aimed at removing from office the Senate’s most liberal 
members and over $1.2 million was spent on television* 
radio* literature and direct mail used against them. The
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results were that of the five Senators targeted by NCPAC, 
four of them - McGovern, Church, Culver and Bayh - were 
defeated. Only Alan Cranston, (Democrat-California), of 
the originally targeted incumbents, survived and was 
re-elected. (Conservative Digest, 12/80:2-3)
Unlike most other Political Action Committees,
NGPAC makes a point of involving itself in state elections, 
both gubernatorial and legislative. Working on this level, 
they are able to directly affect issues being decided by 
state legislatures such as the Equal Rights Amendment 
ratification and the D.C. Amendment. And by campaigning 
on the state level, which provides a wide variety of 
campaign situations, they are able to test new campaign 
techniques at minimal cost. Involvement on this level 
of politics also affords the opportunity to locate and 
develop future conservative leaders. NCPAC also involves 
itself extensively in primary races, assessing that 
financial assistance in a primary often does more good 
than in a general election, when money and technical support - 
especially from the major political parties - is more 
readily available to candidates. (Conservative Digest, 
1/79:26-27)
Dolan also chairs the Washington Legal Foundation, 
one of the New Right’s pro-business "public interest" law 
firms that were created in response to the Ralph Nader 
groups. The Foundation has battled federal agencies such 
as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
and it provides major legal assistance to conservatives.
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Dolan also co-chairs the Conservatives Against Liberal 
Legislation (CALL), a lobbying group. (Viguerie, 1981:
58; Hunter, 1981:118; Conservative Digest, 8/78:47)
Direct mail keeps Dolan’s organizations afloat, 
and his high-pitched fund-raising appeals, he explained 
to Crawford, are aimed to "make ’em angry...stir up 
hostilities... We are trying to be divisive... The shriller 
you are, the better it is to raise money." (Crawford, 1980:227)
While these four men laid the foundation for, and 
provide the core leadership of the New Right, there are 
other significant leaders as well.
Reverend Jerry Falwell, most well-known and 
prominent of the religious New Right, he founded and 
heads the Moral Majority;
Phyllis Schlafly, founder and national chairperson 
of Stop ERA;
Morton Blackwell, contributing editor to Conservative 
Digest, he was chairperson of the Committee for Responsible 
Youth Politics (CRYP) and president of the Leadership 
Institute. Through these groups, he has "recruited and 
trained literally thousands of young men and women, hundreds 
of whom now hold responsible positions in the conservative 
movement at national, state and local levels." (Viguerie, 1981:59)
Alan Gottlieb, executive director of the Citizens 
Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms;
Lt. General Daniel Graham, top security expert and
21.
and spokesperson for the New Right, co-chairperson of the 
Coalition for Peace Through Strength;
Reed Larson, president of the National Right to 
Work Committee;
Edwin Feulner, president of the Heritage Foundation;
Daniel J. Popeio, executive director of the Washington 
Legal Foundation;
Kathy Teague, executive director of the American 
Legislative Exchange Council;
Reverend Robert Billings, executive director of 
Moral Majority;
Lee Edwards, original director of the Committee for 
Responsible Youth Politics and the first editor of 
Conservative Digest;
Greg Hilton, executive director of the Conservative 
Victory Fund;
Paul Brown, formerly executive secretary of the 
National Right to Life Committee, president of American 
Life Lobby;
Peter B. Gemma, national director of the National 
Pro-Life Political Action Committee;
David Denholm, president of the Public Service Research 
Council (PSRC);
Rhonda Stahlman, co-chairperson of Conservatives 
Against Liberal Legislation;
Lew Uhler, chairperson of the National Tax Limitation 
Committee.
Prominent New Right leaders in Congress are 
Republican Senators Jesse Helms (North Carolina), Paul 
Laxalt (Nevada), James McClure (Idaho), Orrin Hatch,
Jake Garn (Utah), Harrison Schmitt (New Mexico), Malcolm 
Wallop (Wyoming), Gordon Humphrey (New Hampshire),
Roger Jepsen (Iowa), William Armstrong ('Colorado) and 
Steve Symms (Idaho). And in the House of Representatives, 
there are Republicans (Phillip Crane (Illinois), Robert 
Dornan (California), Mickey Edwards (Oklahoma), Henry Hyde 
(Illinois), Newt Gingrich (Georgia). (Viguerie, 1981:99-107 
Crawford, 1980:267-268; Conservative Digest, 8/78:47)
The New Religious Right
Historically, there has been a general linkage 
between fundamentalist religion and conservative politics. 
(Johnston, 1982:181) Closely allied to the secular New 
Right by common political interest is the religious New 
Right, or what one sociologist has called "The New 
Christian Right." (Johnston, 1982:181) The secular and 
the religious Right have established a working relationship 
around their deep involvement in "family issues", 
particularly abortion. They are opposed to abortion, the 
Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights, sex education in the 
schools, because they believe that they "undermine the 
traditional nuclear family, the authority of husbands and 
parents, the domestic order of wife and mother, and the 
entire social and moral order." (Oliker, 1981:8l) As a
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result of what they perceive to be government attacks on 
the family and a general decline in moral values in the 
nation, conservative Christians, particularly fundament­
alist Protestants, began to be "politicized.” Together 
with the secular New Right they have organized around 
four aims: pro-life,, pro-moral, pro-family, and
pro-American.
The alliance of the secular and religious Right 
has benefited both parties; combined, the two groups 
have made the New Right conservative movement a much 
more powerful movement. The merging of these two groups 
was not an accidental phenomenon, but rather was the 
result of strategic planning by New Right leaders:
It the merger is the result of the 
conscious recruiting efforts of leaders 
of the Right Wing like Paul Weyrich and 
Howard Phillips. As they developed the 
strategy of mobilizing constituents 
around single issues, they found in the 
evangelical movement a potential 
constituency for their formerly unsellable 
economic program— a program that 
historically has lacked support. Cloaked 
under the banner of anti-ERA, anti-gay 
rights, and now pro-morality and pro- 
God, the Right has found a new platform, 
around which they may mobilize voters.
(Huntington, 1982:76)
The Religious Right, too, has benefited from this
alliance, and its leadership has gained political
sophistication as a result of the alliance:
Preachers who had been calling for the 
nation’s return to ’Christian’ values 
in government, school and society at 
large have learned how to become vocal,
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with the help of right-wing strategists, 
on questions like school prayer and 
school tax exemption. They learned 
how to mobilize their constituency 
into religious and political arenas.
(Huntington, 1982:76)
While fundamentalists— ministers and followers
alike--have historically been reluctant to engage in
political activity under an explicitly religious banner,
the new religious Right aggressively engages in political
activity in the name of fundamentalist Christianity.
Urging their constituencies to get involved in political
activity, evangelists like Jerry Falwell and Pat
Robertson hold out to their flock an image of a once-
moral nation gone astray:
Politics and decision-making, the schools 
and popular culture had become dominated 
by ’humanists,’ who allegedly acted on 
secular, amoral whims and desires, rather 
than on Biblical moral precepts. The 
litany of ’humanist’ sins emphasized 
issues of culture and morality—  
pornography, the rights status of 
homosexuals, drug use— but also 
included more general politics, such 
as the welfare system, the Equal 
Rights Amendment, foreign policy and 
arms-limitation efforts. (Johnston,
1982:190)
These shared concerns, coupled with a resolve to 
take political action to achieve legislative objectives, 
led to the formation of the Moral Majority, the largest 
of the New Right religious organizations. The religious 
Right, and in particular the Moral Majority, has been 
instrumental in mobilizing and organizing the conservative 
movement. And many credited the shift of religious voters
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from Carter to Reagan in 1980 with Reagan’s presidential 
victory. Viguerie is quick to acknowledge the signif­
icance of the religious Right:
...numerically and perhaps historically, 
our most important asset is Dr. Jerry 
Falwell's Moral Majority. Thanks to 
it and similar groups, the nation’s 
evangelical Christians, who had favored 
Jimmy Carter over Gerald Ford by 56$ 
to ^3% in 1976, went for Reagan over 
Carter by 56$ to 3^% in 1980!
(Viguerie, 1981:8)
Although the Moral Majority is explicitly a religious
organization, may of the pro-family groups, though not
themselves explicitly religious, rely heavily on a
conservative religious constituency. The most obvious
example is pro-life groups which are made up mainly of
morally conservative Catholics and Protestants.
Antia Bryant’s anti-gay crusade drew most of its members
from ’’Bible-believing” Christians, and Phyllis Schlafly’s
Sto-ERA group received strong support from church groups.
Moral Majority
Formed in 1979 primarily through the efforts of 
Reverend Jerry Falwell, the idea for Moral Majority came 
out of a meeting in which Ed McAteer, founder and 
president of the Religious Roundtable, introduced Howard 
Phillips to Falwell and Pat Robertson, another media 
preacher. These leading conservatives decided that the 
millions of religious fundamentalists in America were a 
"political army waiting to be mobilized." (Conservative
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Digest, 7/81:8) The term "moral majority" was coined by
Howard Phillips and first used publicly by Weyrich in a
presentation to Falwell and his associates. (Conservative
Digest, 7/81:8)
Moral Majority, reporting its membership at
400,000 claims it registered 2.5 million new voters and
re-registered 1 to 1.5 million voters for the 1980
elections. Since 1979* it has opened up chapters in
47 states. (Viguerie, 1981:127; Huntington, 1982:70)
Falwell attributes the rapid growth of the Moral Majority
to the fact that it touched a "raw nerve in the American
electorate." He said:
Pro-moral people, who felt disenfranchised, 
saw a rallying point, an organization that 
would speak to the issues they were 
concerned with but could never get 
discussed through the liberal-controlled 
media. A majority of decent Americans were 
fed up to the teeth with having their values 
rejected and, in many cases, reversed by 
the power of a government to which they paid 
taxes and sent sons to fight wars.
(Conservative Digest, 1/81:28)
Basically a lobbying and educational organization, Moral
Majority has also raised funds to elect or defeat
selected candidates for political office. Its goal,
according to Falwell, is to "exert a significant
influence on the spiritual and moral direction of our
nation..." Various strategies of the Moral Majority for
achieving this goal include:
(a) mobilizing the grassroots of moral 
Americans in one clear and effective voice;
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(t>) informing the moral majority what is 
going on behind their backs in Washington 
and in state legislatures across the 
country; (c) lobbying intensely in 
Congress to defeat left-wing, social- 
welfare bills that will further erode 
our precious freedom; (d) pushing for 
positive legislation to establish 
the Family Protection Agency, which will 
ensure a strong, enduring America; and,
(e) helping the moral majority in local 
communities to fight pornography, 
homosexuality, the advocacy of morality 
in school textbooks, and other issues 
facing each and every one of us. (Falwell,
1980 :258)
Falwell, who heads, a 15*000 member Baptist church 
in Lynchburg, Virginia, used to criticize clergy who were 
involved in politics during the civil rights and anti-war 
movements of the 1960s. He now urges his flock to get 
involved in politics, explaining his reversal on that 
position on the grounds that the church is being 
"assaulted" and "attacked." Falwell has a radio and TV 
show, the Old Time Gospel Hour, which airs on 325 television 
stations and 300 radio stations each week, claiming to 
reach 15 million Americans. He once called for a 
return to the McCarthy era, where all Communists should 
be registered, saying "we should stamp it on their 
foreheads and send them back to Russia." (Crawford,
1980:160)
While the foundation of the Moral Majority is 
fundamentalist Protestants, Falwell hopes to build a 
coalition with other denominations as well. The potential 
of such a coalition, notes Viguerie, is tremendous:
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There are an estimated 85 million 
Americans— 50 million born-again 
Protestants, 30 million morally 
conservative Catholics, 3 million 
Mormons and 2 million Orthodox and 
Conservative Jews— with whom to build 
a pro-family, Bible-believing coalition.
(Vigueirie, 1980:129)
Pat Robertson, who started the Christian Broadcasting
a?
Network in I960, which today reaches millions of television 
viewers, shares Falwell*s and ViguerieTs optomism about 
the potential for mobilizing the conservative religious 
sectors. He urges his viewers to become politically 
involved so that they can "plaL'cre^  this nation under God.
We have enough votes" he says, "to run this country. And 
when the poeple say, "We’ve had enough,’ we are going 
to take over." (Crawford, 1980:161; Viguerie, 198l;126) 
Daniel Yankelovich, contributing editor to 
Psychology Today and author of the book New Rules (1981) 
analyzes the appeal and success of the Moral Majority.
He contends that it is the Moral Majority’s concern 
with the "moral care and feeding" of children which 
is the primary basis for the organization’s appeal. It 
is this concern about the influence of the prevailing 
moral climate on young people that gives the Moral Majority 
its plausibility to millions of Americans for whom the 
Moral Majority is otherwise anathema. "The organization’s 
connection with this concern leads people who would 
ordinarily reject its proposals out of hand to say, at least 
tacitly, ’Well, maybe they have a point." (Yankelovich, 
1981:8)
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Yankelovich argues that many parents are 
uncomfortable with the "sweeping permissiveness" that 
their own pursuit of permissiveness has created for young 
people. His social-research firm, Yankelovich, Skelly 
and White conducted a nationwide study of the American 
family, and found that even the most untraditional 
parents are likely to raise their children according to 
"traditional" moral precepts. He explains: "Uncertain 
and confused about the full import of their own values, 
they fall back upon simpler, less individualistic, less 
ad hoc principles— values that exist, as it were, ’out 
there’." (Yankelovich, 1981:8)
One would think, says Yankelovich, that parents 
who want their lives to be based on choice, and who want 
the same for their children, would not find any common 
ground with the Moral Majority. He hypothesizes that 
the answer to this lies in the intrinsically uneasy tension 
between the activists in any social movement, and its 
broader constituency. "It is the nature of a social 
movement," he says, "that many people can align themselves 
with it without supporting the full range of Its 
programs." (Yankelovich, 1981:9) He cites, for instance, 
fairly recent examples. While the leaders of the student 
movement against the Vietnam War generally held a New Left 
point of view, the majority of students in the anti-war 
movement did not. Likewise, with the women’s movement: 
while the general constituency of the women’s movement does
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not share the more radical view of the feminist activists, 
there is overlap at the edges. And it is on the basis 
of this overlap that has made the women’s movement one 
of the most influential of our time. Yankelovich argues 
that the same holds true for the Moral Majority and its 
sympathizers. The issue that forges the link between them 
is the social climate in which their children are growing 
up, even though people do not share the whole program of 
the Moral Majority.
The future success of the Moral Majority, 
Yankelovich speculates, is partly dependent upon whether 
the Right remains the only group strongly addressing the 
issue of the "moral welfare" of young people. If there 
is a polarization at the extremes, i.e., total 
permissiveness vs. total restrictiveness, the restrictive 
faction is likely to win out. "When people sense that a 
situation is out of control, the temptation to fall back 
on restrictive measures grows overwhelming." (Yankelovich, 
1981:9) If the cultural Right is the only voice 
expressing concern about the moral climate for children, 
and if they are the only ones perceived to be offering 
programs to improve such climate, then they will be the 
ones to set the agenda. However, if "a moderate middle 
ground can be found, the Moral Majortiy will... shrink 
back to become one of the many minor ideological movements 
on the fringes of American life." (Yankelovich, 1981:9)
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Christian Voice
The Christian Voice is a California-based 
lobbying group formed in 1978; its lobbying arm in 
Washington, D.C. was established in January, 1979.
Early promotional literature of the Christian Voice 
explained the need for their organization: if Christ
were to return to America today, he would find such 
signs of social decay as abortion, homosexuality, 
limitation on public school prayer and secular humanism 
and evolution being taught in the schools. (Huntington, 
1982:70) Their literature articulated that Christ would 
find:
a government so immoral that it thinks 
nothing of betraying Christian allies, 
whether in Taiwan or Rhodesia, while 
catering in every way possible to 
Godless forces of anti-Christ Communism... 
a National Council of Churches, which 
calls for national redistribution of 
wealth (a la Karl Marx) and actively 
supports Marxist guerrillas in Africa, 
whose preoccupation seems to be the 
slaughter of Christian missionaries.
(Huntington, 1982:70)
Christian Voice’s board includes New Right Senators 
Orrin Hatch, James McClure, Roger Jepsen and Gordon 
Humphrey. The second largest Christian lobbying group, 
it shares computerized mailing lists with Moral Majority. 
It seeks to represent in Washington ’’Christian” 
positions on issues, and rates legislators on a "morality 
scale" according to their stands on homosexuality, 
abortion, pornography, prayer in the schools, etc. It
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then sends these ratings and other materials to its 
membership which includes 37,000 clergy from 45 denom­
inations and 150,000 lay members. (Viguerie, 1981:129; 
Crawford, 1980:161-62; Huntington, 1982:70) Criteria for 
the "Congressional Report Card" for the 1980 election 
was the "correct" vote on 14 "Key Moral Issues", including:
the unionization of teachers (’against1); 
lifting sanctions on trade with 
Muzorewa-dominated Rhodesia (’for’); 
racial and sexual quotas on school hiring 
and school busing (’against’); and the 
Taiwan defense treaty (’for’). The 
correct vote was ’against’ a $4 million 
appropriation for the National Science 
Foundation as ’most of these funds 
are used to stack the ideological deck 
in favor of Godless behavioral humanist 
research which contradicts the Christian 
viewpoint of mankind’s nature.’
(Huntington, 1982:70)
Helms, Laxalt and Gordon Humphrey were among those Senators
who received a perfect score of ’100’, as did
Representatives McDonald, Symms, Hyde and Kemp.
Senators Kennedy, Bayh, Muskie, McGovern, among others,
received a score of ’0 ’ as did Representatives Udall,
Dellums and Kastenmeir. (Huntington, 1982:70)
Christian Voice’s Chairperson, Reverend Robert
Grant, was one of the founders of American Christian
Cause, which worked in Anita Bryant’s Florida and the
California Briggs’ anti-gay campaigns. The Washington
office of Christian Voice is headed by Gary Jarmin,
former legislative director of the American Conservative
Union. David Troxler, former assistant director of the
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Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, also works 
with the group. (Conservative Digest, 8/79:15)
Religious Roundtable
The Religious Roundtable, a strategy group formed 
in September, 1979, brings together many evangelical and 
right-wing organizations. It was formed by Ed McAteer, 
who has a history of working with right-wing political 
and Christian groups. According to the Conservative 
Digest , McAteer is the "contact man in the preachers- 
into-politics movement." (Conservative Digest, 9/79:17)
He is also national field director of the Conservative 
Caucus, press contact for Moral Majority, and a board 
member of the Wycliffe Bible Association. He is a close 
friend of Adrien Rogers, president of the 13 million 
member Southern Baptist Convention. "McAteer’s widespread 
contacts in the New Right and the Southern Baptist Church", 
writes the Conservative Digest, "make him invaluable in 
building the pro-family, pro-God coalition." (Conservative 
Digest, 9/79:17)
The Conservative Digest described the Religious 
Roundtable as a "council of 56 conservative members of 
the clergy" organized to "coordinate Christian leaders 
from around the nation who are willing to fight in 
the political arena for pro-God, pro-family, pro-America 
causes." (Conservative Digest, 9/79:17) The Roundtable 
is considered an important part of the new movement of 
Christians into conservative politics. In August, 1980,
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the Religious Roundtable held "national affairs 
briefings" which were attended by 15,000 members of the 
clergy "who had come to learn the mechanics of organizing 
for political action, of creating an awareness of 'their 
issues,1 and of promoting these issues within the political 
system." (Ellerin, 1981:62) The ministers were addressed 
by Senators Jesse Helms and John Connolly, Representative 
Phillip Crane and Reverends Jerry Falwell and James 
Robinson, as well as by Phyllis Schlafly and Paul Weyrich.
Four Keys to Success
"The old right" says Lyn Nofziger, Reagan’s former 
Assistant to the President for Political Affairs, "were 
talkers and pamphleteers. They would as soon go down in 
flames as win. But the New Right has moved toward a more 
pragmatic goal of accomplishing things." (Viguerie, 1981:63) 
The New Right, says Viguerie, has learned "how to recruit, 
how to organized and how to successfully market ideas.
For the first time, the American people are hearing the 
conservative’s solutions to problems." (Viguerie, 1981:12) 
The New Right has built its success on four elements: 
single-issue groups, multi-issue conservative groups, 
coalition politics and direct mail. (Viguerie, 1981:78)
Single-issue groups
Without the single-issue groups which 
were already tapping popular sentiment 
and activity, the New Right would not 
have been able to organize the center
35.
as it has done. The single-issue 
groups are the soil out of which the 
New Right grows. (Hunter, 1981:121)
The independent single-issue groups that emerged in the 
late 1960s and 1970s (e.g. anti-gay, anti-abortion, anti­
gun control groups, advocates of restoring prayer in 
public schools, groups opposed to sex education, etc.) 
have been able to capitalize on the backlash sentiment 
against the sixties radicalism and the Great Society.
They have mobilized that group of people who sense a loss 
of their own social status, who feel that the culture is 
being controlled, more and more, by "new morality" 
liberals.
Single-issue groups have often proved decisive 
in primary and general elections through their ability 
to mobilize votes for or against candidates based on their 
stand on any one issue. Their success has been due, in 
large part, to the rise of political action committees 
(PACs) with their ample funding, the low voter turnouts 
which now typify most elections, and the weakness of the 
political parties. The result, according to one political 
analyst, is "single-issue government." (Crotty, 1980:117) 
By reaching out to certain single-issue groups-- 
many of which are very powerful politically, in and of 
themselves--the New Right has been able to "promote itself 
as the center of a dynamic movement." (Hunter, 1981:116)
By working with the single-issue groups, the New Right
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is able to work with people and political organizations
who might not be solidly conservative on all issues.
As Paul Weyrich explains it:
The right-to-life issue has what one 
unsympathetic reporter described as a 
’symbiotic relationship’ with the New 
Right. Whether they want to or not, 
right-to-lifers find they have to work 
with New Right activists, simply because 
nobody else cares about protecting the 
unborn... As circumstances dictate, the 
single-interest groups, organized around 
anti-busing, tax resistance, defense 
issues, parents’ rights, private school 
survival, energy self-sufficiency, and 
other major problems find they are able 
to make common cause with the New Right, 
because the New Right is a political 
force which shares their concerns on 
these issues. (Weyrich, 1982:60)
Although the rise of single-issue groups has
largely been a ’’blessing” for New Right organizers, it
’’has been something of a frustration to them as well.”
(Crawford, 1980:34) Efforts to co-op these groups into
a larger New Right movement have not always been
successful; the Right-to-Life movement, for example,
"while temperamentally related, and overlapping other
New Right groups, have maintained organizational
independence." (Crawford, 1980:35) The right-to-lifers
have their own press, their own political action
committees, even their own political party. The National
Right to Life Committee, for instance, which claims
10 million members and is the oldest, largest and
most established of the antiabortion organizations, seeks
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to keep the abortion issue relatively separate from other 
social issues. This has prompted the New Right to set 
up competing organizations; e.g. Paul Brown and Judie 
Brown head the Life Amendment Political Action Committee 
(LAPAC) and the American Life Lobby (ALL), respectively, 
and are active members of the New Right leadership network. 
(Hunter, 1981:124)
This is not to say, however, that there is not 
a great deal of cooperation between autonomous single­
issue groups and the primary New Right organizations.
Not only is there cooperation but a significant overlap 
in the organizations as well. And this cooperation has 
been significantly furthered through the New Right’s 
ability to organize these different single-issue groups 
into a "pro-family" coalition, which will be discussed 
further in a later section.
Multi-issue conservative groups
Groups such as the Conservative Caucus, the 
American Conservative Union, Committee for the Survival 
of a Free Congress, the Heritage Foundation, take a 
broad overview on issues, and are consistently conserv­
ative on all major issues. They attempt to cover "all 
the bases on all the issues for the conservative 
movement" and thus have a smaller constituency than do 
the single-issue groups. (Viguerie, 1981:84)
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The multi-issue movement is led by "generalists 
like Paul Weyrich and Howard Phillips, who have well thought 
out positions on almost every issue. These groups are 
sensitive to all the elements of the growing conservative 
coalition." (Viguerie, 1981:84) The leaders of the 
multi-issue groups work to build larger coalitions for 
the conservative movement. Says Viguerie, "When a Right 
to Word expert lectures at a Right to Life workshop on 
lobbying, it’s a safe bet that a conservative movement 
leader had a hand in planning the workshop." (Viguerie, 
1981:85) A large number of organizations, most 
important being the single-issue groups, tie into these 
core groups and have been brought within the New Right’s 
sphere of influence. (Hunter, 1981:117)
Leaders of the multi-issue conservative organ­
izations meet in regular bi-weekly meetings (called 
"Kingston" meetings for the room where they first met) 
to plan strategy, allocate resources, and evaluate ongoing 
activities. It includes more than fifty organizations.
Among its members are representatives from the 
Republican Study Committee, the Committee for the 
Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC), Conservative Caucus, 
National Association of Manufacturers, American 
Conservative Union, National Conservative Political 
Action Committee, Conservative Digest and New Right 
Report and Congressman Orrin Hatch. The purpose of the
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group, as stated by Christian Voice, is "the
coordination of efforts among top Washington conservative
groups with regard to current legislation and policy
issues." (Huntington, 1982:71)
Lisa Wohl, contributing editor to MS. magazine,
comments on the political significance of the New
Right’s organizational networking, and on how the Left
is lacking in this area:
To envision the way the new right is 
organizing, imagine how far along we’d 
be if a comparable liberal ’Kingston 
Group,’ with organized labor, civil 
rights, women’s rights, and environ­
mentalists— everyone from AFL-CIO 
to the welfare mothers— met weekly 
to coordinate activities and plan 
political strategy. (Wohl, 1979:
94-95)
Coalition Politics
Unlike the old Right, the New Right strongly favors 
coalition politics. New Right conservatives are 
making their movement strong and more effective 
politically by helping one another on a broad range 
of issues by forming ad hoc alliances. They have formed 
ad hoc coalitions around such issues as the Panama Canal, 
the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, pornography, 
right-to-work laws, the B-l bomber, welfare, federal 
financing of elections, gun control, disarmament, common 
situs picketing, prayer in the schools, Cuba, school 
busing to achieve racial desegregation, revision of the 
labor law and China. (Conservative Digest, 1/78:6)
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The New Right will work with any group who agrees
with them— regardless of party line. Says Viguerie,
We are more than willing to support 
Democrats as long as they are 
Democrats who are basically right 
of center. It1s a matter of simple 
arithmetic and common sense...
Coaltion politics includes working 
within the Republican and Democratic 
parties to nominate conservative 
candidates, promote conservative 
positions and create conservative 
majorities in both parties.
(Viguerie, 1981:87-88)
What it comes down to for the New Right is their belief
in putting ’’principle before party.” Loyalty to issues
takes precedence over loyalty to political parties.
Liberals, says Viguerie, have been practicing coalition
politics successfully for years, while "conservatives
limited themselves to the Republican Party. No wonder
we were such a small minority." (Viguerie, 1981:87)
Viguerie urges conservatives to get involved in both
parties because they are a "goldmine of opportunity."
They have local, state and national committees, and
Congressional and Senatorial campaign committees which
have "important legal powers, huge spending capabilities,
easy access to news media coverage and are often the
key role in picking who will be the party nominee."
(Viguerie, 1981:89) And if conservatives can be
influential in picking both nominees, then it does not
matter who wins the election:
Conservatives should work for the day 
when the November election is between a
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conservative Democrat and a conservative 
Republican. Then we can go fishing or 
play golf on election day knowing that 
it doesnTt matter if a Republican or 
Democrat wins— it’s only important 
that a conservative wins. (Viguerie,, 
1981:89)
Direct Mail
The media, according to the New Right, is
controlled by the liberal establishment. As such,
liberals have an easier time getting their views across
to the public, and they are given more publicity by the
press than are conservatives. Says Viguerie,
a liberal can become a ’leader’ even if 
he has never held public office, as the 
liberal press will give their own 
plenty of free publicity.
Conservatives have equally talented 
people but they are seldom heard of because 
they have not had massive TV, magazine and 
newspaper publicity. (Conservative 
Digest, 3/77:56)
As a result of what they see to be liberal control of the
media, the New Right has developed its own method of
communication— direct mail— at which it excels at and
which the liberal establishment cannot control. ’’You
can think of direct mail as our TV, radio, daily
newspapers and weekly magazines”, says Viguerie. 
(Conservative Digest, 4/77:56) Without direct mail, 
he believes, the conservative movement would "wither and 
die. "
Direct mail is used not only as a method of fund­
raising, but as an organizational tool and as a means
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for propagandizing for the New Right as well. Direct 
mail, outlines Viguerie,
r helps find the conservatives among 
215,000,000 Americans.
o informs conservatives as to which battles 
must be fought today, this week or this 
month.
• advises conservatives where conservative 
candidates are running, and that they 
need our help.
• brings the conservative message to tens 
of millions of Americans who have never 
heard of Conservative Digest, Human Events, 
National Review, The Conservative Caucus
or the American Conservative Union. Those 
millions of letters are helping convert 
millions of Americans into conservative 
activists. (Conservative Digest, 4/77:56)
The New Right and Social Issues
For the past 40 years, conservatives 
have stressed almost exclusively economic 
and foreign policy. The New Right shares 
the same basic beliefs of other 
conservatives in economic and foreign 
policy matters, but we feel that 
conservatives cannot become the dominant 
political force in America until we 
stress the issues of concern to ethnic 
and blue-collar Americans, born-again 
Christians, pro-life Christians and 
Jews. (Viguerie, 1981:186)
The issues of concern which Viguerie refers to are 
social issues. The New RightTs focus on social issues 
distinguishes it from the old Right. Many of the social 
issues stressed by the New Right are emotionally-charged 
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, busing and gun 
control. ’’The most important contribution of the New 
Right to the cause of conservatism’’ says New Right 
columnist William Rusher, "is neither theoretical nor
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technical, but emotional." (Rusher, 1982:23) (emphasis 
added)
It is its focus on social issues which has brought 
many social conservatives under the New Right umbrella. 
Robert Whitaker, in his forward to The New Right Papers, 
writes:
due attention must be given to the issues 
that brought the social conservatives into 
the coalition and under the Republican 
tent in the first place. These are, of 
course, the so-called ’social issues’ —  
the entire spectrum of ’pro-family’ 
issues (right-to-life, opposition to 
the constant expansion of ’gay rights’, 
and general support for the institution 
of marriage), pornography, gun-control, 
street crime, busing, drug abuse, capital 
punishment, etc. (Whitaker, 1982:23)
And correspondingly, through its courting of the single­
issue groups which have mobilized around these issues, 
the New Right has been able to "reach the new segments 
of the population not attracted to the older right-wing 
organization." (Hunter, 1981:121)
The old Right emphasized military and economic 
issues and identified its "enemies" as international 
communists and labor movements, for their was a backlash 
against an earlier period of Left political activity. 
Economic conservatism and anticommunism have not diminished 
in importance for the Right, but currently it is social 
conservatism which is most emphasized by the New Right 
and which accounts for its rapid rise to political power 
and prominence. And of all the social issues, it is
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antifeminist and conservative sexual issues that most
define the New Right's outlook and are at the heart of
the conservative backlash. (Hunter, 1981; Gordon and Hunter,
1977; Petchesky, 1981; Eisenstein, 1981)
This shift is not surprising given the 
weakness of the Left and labor movements 
at the present time; whereas the women's 
liberation movement in the 1970s had become 
the most dynamic force for social change 
in the country, the one most directly 
threatening not only to conservative 
values and interests, but also to 
significant groups whose 'way of life' 
is challenged by ideas of sexual 
liberation. (Petchesky, 1981:211)
There is some debate over the role that racism
plays in the New Right's program. One view is that the
New Right is not overly racist, but rather "insensitive"
to black people. Alan Crawford says,
While it would be inaccurate to 
attribute overt racism to much of the 
New Right, the appeal to fears about 
busing and quotas and welfare can 
play on racial anxieties. The 
disgruntled Wallaceites who are an 
important part of their constituency, 
express considerable status insecurity 
that for some Americans has a racial 
base. The New Right, at the least, seems 
unquestionably insensitive to the interests 
of black Americans. (Crawford, 1980:259)
Crawford says that the dominant attitude of the New
Right toward blacks is that expressed by columnist
Patrick J. Buchanan in a column entitled "GOP Vote
Search Should Bypass Ghetto." In his article, Buchanan
argued that black people have been ungrateful for the
efforts made by Republicans on their behalf. Republicans
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should stop trying to compete with Democrats for 
black votes; after all, they were able to win the White 
House in 1968, 1972 and 1980 without them. (Crawford, 
1980:258-59.)
Crawford cites an example that for him dramatized 
the New Right's "insensitivity" towards black people.
While serving a stint as Conservative Digest editor, 
the staff was preparing to publish an article on Clay 
Smothers, a black Wallaceite. One of the editors 
presented the headline for the article: CLAY SMOTHERS:
A BLACK OF A DIFFERENT COLOR. Crawford suggested that 
Smothers might not be "honored" by the headline and it 
was eventually changed to: A BLACK CONSERVATIVE CHAMPION.
(Crawford, 1980:259)
In an article by Kevin Phillips published in the 
Conservative Digest, Phillips refers to affirmative 
action as "the new racism" and criticizes "minority 
fetishism"— i.e. affirmative action, subsidized housing 
for minorities, minority training and rehabilitation, 
"minority-oriented educational sociology", etc. Saying 
that "minority fetishism" has cost Americans dearly, he 
implies that these minority programs are responsible for 
the "decline" of America: "Coincidentally, perhaps, the 
years since 1963-64 have seen the onset of U.S. world 
decline." (Conservative Digest, 3/78:15)
What makes the New Right "new" is its insistent 
emphasis on issues related to the family and sexuality,
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and much of the success of the New Right has been
attributed to its ability to capitalize on these issues.
Antifeminism and conservative sexual issues have been
the defining projects of the New Right.
If there is anything 'new* about the 
current right wing in the United States 
it is its tendency to locate sexual, 
reproductive,, and family issues at the 
center of its political program— not 
as manipulative rhetoric only, but as 
the substantive core of a politics 
geared, on a level that outdistances 
any previous right-wing movements in 
this country, to mobilizing a mass 
following. The politics of the family, 
sexuality, and reproduction— and most 
directly of abortion— became a primary 
vehicle through which right-wing 
politicians achieved their ascent to 
state power in the late 1970 and the 1980 
elections. (Petchesky, 1981:207)
The New Right and the Two-Party System
The New Right, by no means, unreservedly endorses 
the Republican Party. They support conservatives—  
whether they be Republicans, Democrats or Independents.
The New Right’s creed is ideology before party. This 
lack of ’’blind party loyalty” has alienated the New Right 
from some Republicans. The New Right, with its 
conservative single-issue groups and Political Action 
Committees, has been criticized by Republicans for 
draining support away from the GOP. But the New Right 
maintains that, in fact, they help the GOP because a 
huge majority of the contributions from their single-issue 
groups and Political Action Committees go to Republican
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candidates and helps the Republican Party win elections
and legislative battles.
j^The New Right faults the Republican Party for its
inactivity and its failure to adequately defend the
conservative viewpoint. In general, there has been
broad dissatisfaction with the Republican Party within
New'Right circlesj For example, in December, 1979*
William Rusher wrote a piece attacking national Republican
fundraising practices, accusing the GOP of deception in
that it would raise money with conservative slogans and
pledges and then betray those commitments and/or use
the money to support liberal Republicans. Rusher called
the Republican Party a "net disservice to the cause of
conservatism, the fundamental principles of two-party
politics, and the best interests of the United States."
(Conservative Digest, 3/79:21)
New Right Senator Paul Laxalt (Republican-
Nevada) complained that the Republican Party does not
take clear stands on issues.
[jOne of the deficiencies of the 
Republican Party is that it doesn’t 
seem to stand for anything. Our group 
does; it takes strong positions...
George Wallace may have been right 
when he said there wasn’t much difference 
between the two parties.^ (Conservative 
Digest, 9/78:47)
Terry Dolan and his National Conservative Political
Action Committee (NCPAC) involve themselves extensively
in the primaries in part because Dolan distrusts the
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Republican national leadership’s ability to choose or
elect the best conservatives. Dolan wants to be
personally involved in developing conservative
candidates. (Conservative Digest, 1/79:27)
The growth of single-interest groups, which has
benefited the New Right, has created some alarm amongst
political observers on all sides of the political
spectrum. The rise of single-issue groups has been
blamed for the "fragmentation" of American politics.
(Crotty, 1980:117) "Uncompromising" single-interest
groups are seen as causing the disintegration of a stable
pattern of politics based on two-party competition.
Alarm has been raised from both Democrats and Republicans.
Common Cause Vice-President, Fred Wertheimer, in 1978
speculated that in the near future Congress will be
representing PACs instead of consituents. (Conservative
Digest, 12/78:18) ^New Right leaders, however, believe
that the Democratic and Republican parties themselves
are responsible for the growth of single-issue groups.
Paul Weyrich maintains that the New Right has not
weakened the two-party system, but rather has simply
stepped into the vacumn created by the existence of an
already-weakened two party s y s t e m J
Had the political parties been providing 
these services, particularly the Republican 
Party with respect to conservative 
candidates, we wouldn’t be competitive.
The parties were weak, we saw that they
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were weak, and we helped to fill the 
vacumn. (Conservative Digest* 12/79:12)
The proliferation of single-issue groups represent
a rebellion against the "tyranny" of the two party 
system:
No longer do voters have to settle for 
the 1 lesser of two evilsT on election day. 
Through continued involvement in a political 
or social action committee, an individual's 
vote on election day becomes more than 
just the endorsement of other people's 
choices. People have come to realize 
that their deeply held convictions need 
not be subjugated to the will of the 
party majority* but can be expressed 
separately and effectively through 
association in a number of issue- 
oriented groups. (Conservative Digest*
12/78:18)
JjThe New Right faults the Democratic and Repub­
lican parties for failure to make philosophical 
distinctions between themselves* and Paul Weyrich maintains 
that as a result* people are going outside the two-party
system in order to address their grievances
I am committed to the two-party system 
because I think it is far preferable to 
a multi-party system. The problem is* 
we don't have a two-party system. In 
my judgment* we have a one-party system 
with two branches* both of which are 
more or less committed to the same 
kinds of things. Those of us who have 
strong points of view on some issues 
don't have an outlet in either political 
party.
It is true that we have some people in 
each political party who articulate and 
are sympathetic to our point of view* 
but neither party wants to confront 
these issues. That is why we have all
50.
these groups springing up throughout 
the country; people who feel strongly 
no longer have a release within the 
political parties. Rather, they have 
had to go out and organize their own 
extracurricular activities to influence 
the political system. (Conservative 
Digest, 12/79:12)
jjThe political process must be opened up, contends the new 
conservative movement, rather than be shackled to 
unresponsive party hierarchies^] Nathan Muller calls 
the proliferation of single-issue groups and the accomp­
anying awakened constituency, the "new politics"—
"a widespread perception that government is indeed the 
creature of the governed, and that people have the 
right, the power, the duty to control its size, cost, 
powers, and direction." (Conservative Digest, 12/78:19) 
This "New Politics" which Muller talked of in 1978, and 
which would later be termed the "New Populism" stresses 
active participation in the political process and a 
greater role in the public policy-making sphere. "In 
the midst of a dynamic political movement" says Muller, 
"people are demanding accountability from their elected 
representatives." (Conservative Digest, 12/78:18) 
Single-interest groups, Muller contends, serve as an 
additional check on the "awesome powers" of government 
and act to curb the "disproportionate" influence of 
opposing groups:
There is nothing to fear from a strong, 
centralized government as long as many 
factions compete for its favor. The real
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danger to our political system is 
having too few, rather than too many 
single-interest groups; of burdening 
them with more and more regulations 
so that only a select few will survive 
and wield power and influence. 
(Conservative Digest,, 12/78:19)
CHAPTER II
THE 1980 ELECTIONS
Unlike the old Right, the New Right has been
very concerned with winning elections, and culminating
in the 1980 elections they have demonstrated their
success with electoral politics.
By the end of 1979 * the New Right claimed 
that 168 members of the House of Rep­
resentatives could be counted on to 
vote its position on important issues.
According to its own 1979 estimates, a 
minimum of 24 U.S. Senators would 
predictably vote the New Right line and 
six more would probably do so— only 
four short of the votes needed to block 
treaty ratification, and 11 short of 
those required to prevent cloture of a 
fillibuster. (Ellerin, 1981:59)
New Right leader Richard Viguerie was confident
that the New Right played a pivotal role both in Reagan's
victory and in the election of a conservative Congress:
Without the New Right, Candidate Ronald 
Reagan would have pulled something less 
than 50$ of the total popular vote.
...Without the New Right, President Reagan 
would have faced a Congress still 
dominated by liberal Democrats in both 
houses... But with the help of the New 
Right, Ronald Reagan sits today in the White 
House with a Republican Senate, a much more 
conservative House of Representatives, and 
an American public who has been sold on 
conservative ideas. (Viguerie, 1981:12)
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In the 1980 Senate elections, four of the five Democratic
Senatorial targets of the National Conservative Political
Action Committee's T,hit list" - Bayh of Indiana, Culver of
Iowa, McGovern of South Dakota, and Church of Iowa - were
defeated. Of the seventeen Senatorial and sixteen Congressional
candidates that the New Right supported, fourteen
candidates won Senate seats and eleven won House seats.
The New Right was also active on the state and local
levels as well. For example,
in Gainesville, Fla., 42 Moral Majority 
candidates ran for virtually all seats open 
on the county Democratic Executive Committee 
and won. In California, Moral Majority issued 
a survey of attitudes of candidates for 
state assembly and senate prior to the 
elections. Of the 28 candidates receiving a 
Moral Majority rating of 100 percent, 14 won.
(Ellerin, 1981:55)
The conservative movement came to power through the 
vehicle of the 1980 elections, the New Right maintains, 
because liberalism proved it did not work, and because the 
conservative movement talked about the issues that people 
were concerned about. The 1980 election, Paul Weyrich 
maintained, showed that liberalism was "bankrupt" because 
it had "gotten out of sync" with the American people. 
(Conservative Digest, 7/81:2) The New Right came of age 
in the 1980 elections because it had many advantages over 
the Left. The advantages of the Right, Viguerie outlines 
are: leadership, technology and popular issues:
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The LeftTs leadership for the most part... 
are now dead or retired or just about to 
pass from the political scene. So, in the 
1980s it will be conservatives who have 
the leadership in Congress.
The Left doesnTt have the technology 
we have. They don’t have the knowledge of 
direct mail, computers, television, radio...
We have about an eight to ten year lead on 
the Left in the use of technology, and it's 
our challenge to keep that lead.
The liberals don't have the popular 
issues. It's conservatives who can go to 
the people with issues that people are 
concerned about: sex on television, abortion,
prayer in school, a strong national defense, 
law and order, crime, high taxes. W e ’re the 
ones who have the issues that are going to 
appeal to the American people in the 1980s.
The people who are going to be interested
in solving the problems with their dollars
and working the precincts are going to be 
conservatives. We have the ability, we have 
the issues and it's our challenge to go out 
there and get millions of new people involved 
in our movement in the next few years.
(Conservative Digest, 2/81:27)
New Right leaders claimed that Reagan's victory 
represented a mandate for conservatism. Terry Dolan said,
"the election clearly indicates that Ronald Reagan has the
biggest mandate any president has received since Franklin 
Roosevelt. To be sure, it is a conservative mandate." 
(Conservative Digest, 11/80:7) Likewise, Reverend Jerry
Falwell said that the election results represented a mandate 
for the'Moral Majority’s conservative principles and that 
Reagan had to "produce" on issues such as the Human Life 
Amendment. (Riddiough, 1981:38)
Anti-ERAer Phyllis Schlafly claimed that more 
specifically than the New Right, it was the conservative 
pro-family movement that was responsible for nominating
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and electing Ronald Reagan as President in 1980. Reagan 
won, she asserted, because he "rode the rising tides of 
the pro-family movement and the conservative movement." 
Contending that it was "moral" issues which moved millions 
of nonvoters into the polls in 1980, she cited V. Lance 
Tarrance Associates, pollster in Houston, Texas, who found 
that 21% of nonvoters were born-again Christians and the 
two issues which most motivated them were prayer in the 
schools and abortion. His surveys found that about 15# 
of nonvoters can be motivated to return to the polls if 
they are given sufficient reasons to do so. It was the 
social issues articulated by the pro-family movement, she 
maintains, that spurred millions of nonvoters to vote in 
1980 - and they voted for Reagan. (Conservative Digest, 
1/81:20-21) Thus, she maintains, the vote for Reagan 
represented a mandate for the Human Life Amendment, for 
prayer in the schools, against affirmative action, against 
the Equal Rights Amendment, against gay rights, etc.
The 1980 election certainly established the New 
Right as a credible and viable force in American politics. 
Beyond that acknowledgement, however, there exists wide 
disagreements over whether a) the New Right played a key 
role in the 1980 election, and b) whether the election 
represents a mandate for Reagan and conservatism.
On the first point, New York opinion researcher 
Arthur J. Finkelstein, who conducted surveys for NCPAC in
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its target states throught the election, found that where 
NCPAC was most heavily involved, its presence had been 
crucial. The most important thing that NCPAC did, he contends, 
"was set the agenda." (Keller, 1980:373) However, pollster 
Brian Vargus, who conducts research for Indiana and Purdue 
Universities said that their polls showed little familiarity 
among those polled with NCPAC slogans. They also found 
little focus on issues generally. In regards to the Quayle/
Bayh race (in which Bayh, who was on the "hit list", was 
defeated), Vargus said: "It is my impression that the election 
of Dan Quayle had virtually nothing to do with issues. We 
heard it again and again in our polling: 'It is time for
a change. Bayh has been there long enough!’" (Keller, 1980:3373) 
Likewise, a number of Republican Senators who were 
supported by NCPAC and the New Right not only denied that 
they were helped by them, but in some cases, argued that 
they were even hurt by them. As the Congressional Quarterly 
reported, Republican James Abdnor, who defeated George 
McGovern, filed a complaint with the Federal Election 
Commission charging that NCPAC had used his name without 
authorization. His press secretary said that NCPAC probably 
did not make any difference in the election. Charles 
Grassley, who defeated John Culver, was said to have felt 
the same way. An aide to Steve Symms, who ousted Frank 
Church, said, "I think if anything, groups such as NCPAC 
probably hindered Steve Symms. I think people got tired 
of trash." Dan Quayle, who defeated Bayh, appeared on the
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NBC "Today" show a few days after the election and commented 
that late in the campaign it appeared that "New Right 
groups might cost the Republicans the election" in South 
Dakota, Iowa and Idaho. (Keller, 1980:3372)
Lipset and Raab (1981) also contend that the impact 
of the New Right, and specifically the evangelical religious 
Right, in the 1980 election was overstated. While NCPAC 
claimed credit for the defeat of four of the five targeted 
Democratic senators, Lipset and Raab point out that the 
decline in the defeated Democratic senators’ votes was 
"almost identical with that of the Democratic senatorial 
candidates in eighteen non-targeted states in the North.
The average vote for the four liberal Senators fell from
54.5 percent in 1974 to 48 in 1980; the Democratic senatorial
vote in the eighteen other Northern contests declined
from 55 percent to 48." (Lipset, 1981:29) They also argue that
the fundamentalist Right did not play a decisive role in
election results. They noted that a slightly smaller
percentage of born-again white Protestants (6l percent)
than of other white Protestants (63 percent) actually
voted for Reagan. (Lipset, 1981:29) They also cite
similar conclusions reached by other studies; for example,
Arthur Miller, study director of the University of
Michigan's Survey Research Center interviewed 10,000
people, and based on his findings argued that the impact
of fundamentalist groups on the election outcome was much
exaggerated. Louis Harris also argues that
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the right-wing moralists actually hurt 
rather than helped the GOP cause, 
since 'the country has moved slightly to 
the conservative side in opposing nearly 
all new government regulatory measures on 
economic matters, but has riot moved at 
all to the Right on the social issues 
that are such an emotional concern to 
the die-hard right-wing conservatives.
(Lipset, 1981:30)
Those who minimize the New Right's role in the 1980
election also point to the fact that there were conservative
victories in states where the New Right was not active,
such as Wisconsin and New York. They point out further
that there were liberal victories in states on New Right
target lists such as California and Missouri. Some also
argue that the press, fascinated with the phenomenon of
the New Right, "hyped up" the whole affair, thus making
the New Right seem more important than it actually is.
Even pollster Finkelstein, who argued that NCPAC's role
in the election was crucial, acknowledged that "a long
run of media attention created these groups as more
important than they were." (Keller, 1980:3373) Ronald
Roberts, field operative for the Republican Campaign
Committee, said:
A couple of races does not make a trend for the 
New Right. I think it's a nice, easy way 
for the press to explain it. I think it's 
really fun for them to have these people on 
the morning talk shows and say the whole 
game of American politics is changing.
(Keller, 1980:3373)
In regards to the question of whether the election 
represented a mandate for Reagan, a close look at the 1980
voting pattern is illuminating. The voter turnout in 
1980 was approximately 53% of the potential electorate, 
which is to say that almost one-half of the electorate 
chose not to vote. This marked the fifth consecutive 
election that the presidential turnout has declined. It 
was a full percentage point below the 1976 turnout rate 
of 54.4 percent and was the lowest turnout since 1948. Of 
the eligible voters, Reagan polled 27% to Carter's 22%; 
a record 7 1/2 million people voted outside the two-party 
system. Of the potential electorate, then, approximately 
one-fourth voted for Reagan; three-fourths did not. 
Reagan's 27% of the potential electorate compares to 
Johnson's 38% in 1964, Nixon's 34% in 1972 and Carter's 
27% in 1976. (Eisenstein, 1981:189; Hall, 1981:2-3)
Many political analysts and observers saw the 1980 
Reagan victory less as an endorsement of Reagan and right- 
wing ideology and more as a rejection of Carter. The 
New York Times and CBS conducted an "exit poll" the day of 
the election - a detailed survey in which they polled 
12,782 people as they left the polls. Reagan supporters 
indicated anti-Carter sentiment as the main reason they 
voted for Reagan. Only 11% voted for Reagan because they 
regarded him as a "conservative”, while 38% voted for 
Reagan, not for ideological reasons, but because they said 
it was "time for a change." The same poll showed that 
one out of every five voters changed their minds about 
the candidate of their choice in the last five days before
6 0.
the election, indicating that they were not deeply
committed to the programs or candidates of the two
major parties. (Eisenstein, 1981:189-90)
ABC News also conducted an exit poll and found
similar results. Their findings also suggested
dissatisfaction with Carter as the main reason people
voted for Reagan. Their news release commented:
It is clear from the ABC poll of 11,250 
voters that questions about Carter's 
economic policies, his handling of the 
Iran hostage situation, and his overall 
leadership caused many traditional 
Democrats— at the last moment— to vote 
for Reagan. Other Democrats, unwilling 
to vote for Carter, opted for Reagan by 
staying home. (Douglas, 1981:181)
ABC asked voters how they would have voted if the choice
had been between Carter and John Anderson, who was viewed
as more liberal than Carter, and thus ideologically near
the opposite end of the political spectrum from Reagan.
Anderson won, leading the ABC pollsters to conclude that
"for many voters, it was an anybody but Carter affair."
(Douglas, 1981:181)
The 1980 elections took place in the wake of
widespread voter frustration and a desire for "change."
Michael Kazon, editor of Socialist Review argues that
many voters chose Reagan and ousted key liberal Democratic
Senators out of office because of their "anger at the
patent failures of policy-makers." "Their discontent is
volatile", he said, and "tends to be directed against
incumbents, of whatever political stripe." (Kazin, 1981:8)
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Economist Jim Campen echoes the same thought: Carter and
the Democrats lost in 1980 because they seemed unable to
do anything at all about the nation's ever-mounting economic
problems. And in our two-party system, notes Campen,
"hard times generally result in electoral defeat for the
party in office." (Campen, 1981:33)
In 1980 there was growing national frustration at the
country's worsening economic conditions and "loss of prestige"
abroad. Rising unemployment, real wages falling, record
high interest rates, and double-digit inflation all served
to create a pro-change sentiment among voters. And the
Iranian hostage crisis, for many, symbolized America's
weakened position internationally, and served to focus
voter discontent on America's problems. GOP consultant
Lance Tarrance noted that "Reagan was a symbol of pro-change
sentiment." (Keller, 1980:3370) In rejecting Carter,
voters for the second consecutive election 
turned their backs on an embattled incumbent 
to elect a challenger promising a fresh 
approach to government and a dynamic new 
brand of leadership. (Cook, 1980:3296)
The defection of many Democratic blue-collar workers
to Reagan in 1980 was one of the keys to the Republican
victory. Whereas Carter received 56% of the blue-collar
vote in 1976, in 1980 he received only 46%. (Pierce, 1980:1877)
During the campaign, Reagan pounded away at Carter's failures
in dealing with the economy, and was thus able to successfully
court a significant share of the traditionally Democratic
blue-collar vote. His support from this group was also
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strengthened by his appeal to their social conservatism,
and he made every effort to do so because the "social issue
lies at the hiatus between the liberals and the working-
class Democrats." (McWilliams, 1981:274) During the
campaign Reagan put forth a "supply-side" economic doctrine
and argued that dismantling government regulation and
reducing taxes and spending would spur economic growth
and create jobs.
Supply-side seemed to lift the contradiction 
between laissez-faire economics and popular 
welfare. It gave Republicans a way of 
appealing to the blue-collar Democrats as 
well as to country-club Republicans.
(Judis, 1983:23)
Sociologist Todd Gitlin argues that Carter "bumbled" 
so badly that many traditional Democrats would have voted 
for any opponent who was not "conspicuously foaming at 
the mouth." Given this situation, said Gitlin, all Reagan 
needed to do was convince the undecided that he did not 
have an "itchy nuclear trigger finger." (Gitlin, 1981:68-69) 
Apparently the October 28, 1980 presidential debate went 
a long way towards accomplishing that purpose. Reagan's 
"affable performance in the nationally televised... debate 
seemed to take much of the steam out of the Carter assault" 
that Reagan was a right-winger and a threat to world peace. 
(Cook, 1980:3297) In fact, a variety of public opinion polls 
showed an unusually large number of undecided voters in 
the final weeks of the campaign. Apparently many voters 
reconciled themselves to Reagan as a result of the debate.
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The New York Times/CBS exit poll showed that 10% of the 
people who voted for Reagan gave as their reason: He 
"impressed me during the debates." (Pierce, 1980:1877) 
While it was the articulation of social issues 
which largely identified the New Right and which clearly 
distinguished the Republican Party Platform from the 
Democratic Party Platform, it appears that most people 
voted on issues related to the economy. In the same 
New York Times/CBS poll, it was found that people voted 
mostly on economic issues rather than on values, life­
styles or social issues. 40% of Reagan supporters polled 
chose "inflation and economy" as the issues that led them 
to vote for Reagan, while only 5% chose ERA/abortion. 
(Pierce, 1980:1877) These findings prompted Eleanor 
Smeal, President of the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) to remark: "While people were voting on issues of 
the economy and foreign policy, the results will be paid 
for by the women's movement." (Riddiough, 1981:38)
It was social issues, and primarily issues related 
to women's rights and reproduction (the Equal Rights 
Amendment and abortion), which most clearly distinguished 
the Republican and Democratic Party platforms from one 
another. The Republican Party, while stating its 
support for women's rights, opposed ratification of the 
Equal Rights Amendment, opposed abortion, and embraced 
the values of the traditional family:
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We reaffirm our belief in the traditional 
role and values of the family in our society... 
we affirm our support of a constitutional 
amendment to restore protection of the right 
to life for unborn children. We also support 
the Congressional efforts to restrict the use 
of taxpayers’ dollars for abortion...We express 
our support for legislation protecting and 
defending the traditional American family 
against the ongoing erosion of its base in 
our society. We protest the Supreme Court’s 
intrusion into the family structure through 
its denial of the parents' obligation and 
right to guide their minor children.
(reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
1980, Vol. XXXVI:61B-64B)
In contrast, the Democratic Party platform expressed its
support for the Equal Rights Amendment, supported reproductive
freedom (including abortion rights), opposed the Hyde
Amendment, and recognized the family in its ’’diverse forms.”
In addition to stating its support for ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment, it stated:
The Democratic Party shall withold financial 
support and technical campaign assistance 
from candidates who do not support the E.R.A.
The Democratic Party supports the 1973 Supreme 
Court decision on abortion rights as the law 
of the land and opposes any constitutional 
amendment to restrict or overturn that 
decision... The Democratic Party recognizes 
reproductive freedom as a fundamental human 
right. We therefore oppose government 
interference in the reproductive decisions of 
Americans, especially those governmental 
programs or legislative restrictions that 
deny poor Americans their right to privacy 
by funding or advocating one or a limited 
number of reporductive choices only... 
the Democratic Party supports efforts to make 
federal programs more sensitive to the needs 
of the family, in all its diverse forms.
(reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
1980, Vol. XXXVI:97B-105B)
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However, on issues related, to the economy and defense, 
the platforms were more similar than they were different. 
"Both platforms share the analysis that government has 
grown too big in the social service areas and had 
become too small in defense-related activities." 
(Eisenstein, 1981:194-95)
Eisenstein argues that although a "’pro-family’, 
antifeminist" politics was central to Reagan’s platform 
and therefore the election because it helped "mobilize 
key segments of voters", Reagan’s victory cannot be read 
as an unambiguous endorsement of antifeminism (Eisenstein, 
1981:188) as Phyllis Schlafly previously argued. First 
of all, most people did not vote on "feminist" issues, 
but rather on issues related to the economy. In fact, 
many supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment voted for 
Reagan. Since Reagan does not support the Amendment, 
evidently these voters voted on other issues, as the exit 
polls indicated. While a higher percentage of ERA 
supporters went for Carter, 33% of them voted for Reagan. 
(Pierce, 1980:1876) Although their concern for women’s 
rights was evidently overshadowed by their concern for 
the economy, their support of Reagan did not include an 
endorsement of his anti-ERA stand.
Further, as Eisenstein points out, those who 
rejected the antifeminist policies of the Republicans and 
the New.Right, "had no significant way of voicing this 
opinion. Those who wanted an alternative to conservatism
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and antifemism did not feel they could find it in 
Carter." (Eisenstein, 1981:188) While Carter’s support 
of women's rights on the rhetorical and ideological level 
was evident, his actual record was less than impressive. 
For example, he fired Bella Abzug as co-chair of the 
National Advisory Committee on Women, his Administration 
banned medicaid abortions, and his $16 billion slash in 
domestic spending hit women the hardest since women 
constitute a majority of the poor, the low wage-earners 
and welfare recipients. The National Organization of 
Women, which represents the "mainstream" or "liberal" 
tenet of American feminism, recognized that the difference 
between the two parties operated more on the level of 
ideology than substance. They refused to endorse Carter’s 
candidacy and actively campaigned against the New Right 
forces in the Reagan campaign. (Eisenstein, 1981:198; 
Douglas, 1981:177)
The Reagan victory reflected a "small, highly 
mobilized and organized section of the electorate along­
side a much larger, disorganized, disenfranchised public 
which did not vote." (Eisenstein, 1981:188)
As recent voting studies have shown, the 
relative electoral universe is contracting 
as disproportionate numbers of minority, 
low-wage, young and female voters become 
permanent abstentionists. Meanwhile, the 
intensity of participation by middle- 
and high-income brackets has sharply 
increased. Thus the ’greening' of 
American politics effectively disenfranchises 
the poor, while simultaneously ensuring 
that the new activism of the middle classes 
will act as a ventriloquism for
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the voices of corporate PACs and New 
Right lobbies. (Davis, 1981:46)
There is some evidence to suggest that Ttfeminists1 (roughly
defined as one who supports the Equal Rights Amendment and
abortion rights) voted in smaller numbers in the 1980
election than did "non-feminists11 (roughly defined as one
who does not support the Equal Rights Amendment or abortion
rights). A Gallup poll conducted around the time of the
election showed that support for ERA and reproductive
rights outweighed opposition by at least two to one.
64% of those polled favored ERA; 33% opposed. 65% opposed
a ban on abortion, while 31% favored such a ban. However,
only 46% of voters expressed support for ERA. (Riddiough,
1981:52) Riddiough concludes that Mantifeminists were
far better able to get out the votes than were feminists."
(Riddiough, 1981:43)
While acknowledging that the election of 1980
placed anti-feminist forces into offices of' power in the
government, Eisenstein contends that the election does not
represent a similar shift to antifeminist politics on the
part of the general public:
By pointing out the small number of people 
who voted for Reagan as a conservative, I 
do not mean that these small numbers are 
insignificant. Rather, they reflect the 
well-mobilized New Right which represents 
an enormous danger in that it both instigates 
and endorses the movement of the state to 
the right. Nevertheless, it is important 
to put their political clout in the perspective 
of the American public in general...
Although Reagan's election represents a victory 
for antifeminist forces within the state, the
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greater part of the American people,
I believe, can be described as 
'feminist1, if feminism is defined 
as the mainstream politics of liberal 
feminism. (Eisenstein, 1981:188)
She notes that polls have consistently shown majority
support for abortion rights and the Equal Rights
Amendment, and contends that "liberal values of
individual rights and freedom of choice" underlie
this support. (Eisenstein, 1981:197) As Steinfels (1979)
writes in The Neo-Conservatives, the American public is
commited to liberal values: "They are Americans, and
Americans are optimistic liberals. That is, 'equality,
no matter how abused or disused', has always been the
prevailing American norm." (Steinfels, 1979:221)
CHAPTER III 
THE PRO-FAMILY COALITION
We will work in Washington, in state
capitols, in cities and towns, in schools
and churches, everywhere that is necessary, 
to protect and preserve the American 
family as it has developed and evolved 
during our country’s 200 year history.
(Viguerie, 198l:l6l)
The Conservative Digest claims that "no political 
movement in America today has the potential to reach as
vast a constituency as the pro-family movement, for this
movement talks about issues that directly and emotionally 
affect tens of millions of Americans." The pro-family 
movement ’’could be enough to turn America around. This 
could be the most exciting political story of the next 
decade." (Conservative Digest, 8/79:16)
Recognizing the importance of family issues to the 
1980s, the New Right has worked hard both in bringing 
these issues to the forefront, and in "controlling" 
them. Much of the Right's rise to power stems from its 
successful appropriation of the "family" - from "its 
ability to portray itself as the only social force concerned 
with ’family values,’ while depicting feminists as 
antifamily." (Block, 1981:269)
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Perhaps more than any other New Right leader,
Paul Weyrich has stressed the political importance of
the pro-family movement. He has stated that what the
Vietnam War was to the sixties, and environmental and
consumer issues were to the seventies, family issues will
be to the eighties. (Conservative Digest, 8/79:18) Weyrich
says that it became clear to him that a shift was underway
to focus national debate on a new set of issues when think
tanks everywhere began doing family-type studies, and when
conferences like the International Women’s Year and the
Year of the Child were held under federal sponsorship.
And coinciding with these developments, Weyrich notes, were
the decline of the mainline churches in their 
mission of preaching the gospel, and the 
formation of single-issue groups on homosexual 
rights, abortion rights, and so on. All of 
these converged, in my opinion, right at the 
end of the decade, to make it clear that 
lifestyle and family issues are going to be a 
major focus of the 1980s. (Conservative Digest,
5/80:14-15)
While acknowledging that the issues of the economy and
national defense will continue to be areas of concern and
focus for people, they will, Weyrich argues, be tied to the
family issue:
Now there will be other focuses. The economy 
will definitely be one, as will national 
defense. But even economic questions are 
linked to family questions. If the family 
cannot survive without both parents working 
or getting federal welfare, there are all 
sorts of long-range implications for preservation 
of the family. These issues don’t necessarily 
break down along traditional liberal-conservative 
lines, and so there is going to be a certain 
amount of political realignment. (Conservative 
Digest, 5/80:15)
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The working relationship between the religious 
Right and the secular New Right, and between the single­
issue groups and the primary New Right organizations 
have been enhanced by
the decision in 1977 to place groups devoted 
to preservation of the traditional social 
roles of the family, the churches and the 
schools - which are the generalized concerns 
of the antiabortion, antibusing, anti-Equal 
Rights Amendment, and anti-gay constituencies - 
under the more inclusive rubric of the 
’pro-family’ movement. (Crawford, 1980:27)
Pro-family leaders organized the "Library Court" (named
after the street on Capitol Hill where the original meeting
place was located) in Washington, D.C. in the summer of
1979. The Library Court is a fairly close-knit coalition
of over twenty nationwide pro-family groups whose leaders
meet a couple of times a month to discuss tactics and
strategy. (Hunter, 1981:119) A major project of Library
Court is the Legislative Exchange Action Force (LEAF)
which alerts pro-family groups through a phone bank
operation when immediate action is needed on an issue.
(Conservative Digest, 7/81:8)
Context for Emergence of the Pro-Family Movement
The pro-family movement is an outgrowth of the 
anti-gay, anti-abortion, anti-feminist movements. Through 
the use of moral imagery, the pro-family movement has 
linked the issues of feminism, gay and lesbian rights, 
and abortion as destructive to the family unit, and thus
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destructive to society.
In The Politics of Unreason (1970), Lipset and
Raab say that extreme right-wing movements, which are
characteristically expressions of "preservatist" impulses
by social groups who feel their "way of life" is
threatened, rely heavily on moralism.
Desperately preservatist or restorative 
movements— that is backlash movements—  
require an aggressively moralistic stance 
and will find it somewhere. There needs 
to be invoked some system of good and 
evil which transcends the political or 
social process and freezes it. (Lipset,
1970:117)
This system of good and evil invoked by the New Right, 
however, is not arbitrary; it is a "product of the 
particular historical moment and of a conjunction of 
material and social forces that bring specific social 
conflicts to the fore." (Petchesky, 1981:211) In other 
words, argues Petchesky, the embodiment of evil for the 
Right in this period of time is feminism and homosexuality, 
both of which represent movements for "transcendance of 
a patriarchal form of family and for sexual liberation." 
(Petchesky, 1981:211)
Alan Crawford places the New Right within an 
historical perspective in characterizing the New Right 
as a backlash movement. Backlash groups arise, in part, 
as a response to feelings that society has withdrawn 
its approval from the values they uphold. Status 
resentment occurs when groups perceive that their
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prestige in society is threatened by the upward 
mobility of groups traditionally below them on the 
social ladder, and when their values and way of life 
are not afforded the social support and respect they 
once commanded. (Crawford, 1980:148-9)
Traditional forms of authority and domination 
have been deeply challenged over the last twenty years.
The twentieth century experience, writes Bill Resnick, 
staff member of the Socialist Review journal, has been 
an "uneven but continuous democratic surge, a 
strengthening of subordinate groups and weakening of 
established authority." (Resnick, 1981:22) This process 
has
disrupted every area of social life 
and every core institution— resulting 
in discipline problems in workplace 
and schools, an unreliable army, 
fragmented political parties, and 
stalemated government, parent/child 
conflict, great distress among both 
men and women around family and 
sex. (Resnick, 1981:22)
Issues related to the family— sexual mores, family
structure, male/female relationships, etc.— have
particularly undergone tremendous changes in the past
two decades. The structure of the family itself has
undergone dramatic changes. By 1977, three-fourths of
all married women were working outside the home, as well
as over one-half of those with school-age children. One
out of three marriages end in divorce. The fertility rate
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has reached its lowest point in this country’s 
history, reflecting a reduction in average family size.
By 1977., one out of seven households in the United 
States was headed by a single woman. One out of five 
Americans live alone, that is, not in a "family.11 
Over one million households consist of unmarried couples. 
(Petchesky, 1981:235-36)
In his book, New Rules, cultural analyst Daniel 
Yankelovich sees our society going through adjustments 
not unlike the geological folding and faulting of plate 
tectonics, when there is a shift in the "giant plates 
that undergird the earth’s surface and keep it stable 
and rigid." (Yankelovich, 1981:57) The public’s 
understanding of women’s role, and women’s view of 
themselves, has undergone such a major shift. It is 
the reaction against the changing views of women, 
sexual relationships, and the family structure which 
accounts, perhaps as much or more than anything else, 
for the rise of the pro-family movement specifically, 
and the New Right generally. These changes have not been 
easy for anyone. Change often threatens. And changes 
which touch on people’s view of themselves or others, 
or changes which touch people where they are often 
their most vulnerable— their sexuality— can threaten 
deeply.
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These are changes whose major upswing has 
occurred only during the last twenty years, 
less than one generation, and whose impact 
on people’s lives and expectations for 
themselves and their children has undoubtedly 
been intense and unsettling. Absorbing 
that impact has been difficult for all 
people, including comitted feminists, who 
believe strongly in the need for divorce, 
birth control, and sexual freedom. For 
those persons whose belief has remained 
unshaken in their prerogative, as a man 
to ’have the authority and make the 
decision,' or their privilege, as a woman,
’to be happy with it’ - it must seem a very 
alien and treacherous world. (Petchesky, 1981:236)
Feminists and others on the Left have tended to view these
changes in a positive light, while acknowledging, nevertheless
that the changes are often difficult. However, the New
Right has not perceived these changes as "a breakthrough
in human consciousness but as a threat to stable patterns."
(Wall, 1982:499)
New Right/Pro-Family Ideology
The Family
Over and over again, the theme that runs 
throughout New Right literature on the family is the 
belief that a "strong family" is the basis for a "strong 
America." Falwell says, "No nation has ever been 
stronger than the families within her", and "the strength 
and stability of families determine the vitality and 
moral life of society." (Falwell, 1980:121,123)
Senator Jesse Helms says, "We must restore and preserve 
the family as the focus of our personal and social
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well-being and the strongest defense we have against 
the totalitarian state.” (Falwell, 1980:137) A strong 
family Is the foundation of a strong society. Weaken 
the institution of the family and the entire fabric of 
society is weakened. Educational consultant to the 
Heritage Foundation, Dr. Onalee McGraw says, "The 
recovery of the family is nothing less than the 
recovery of our common humanity." (Conservative Digest, 
3/81:28)
The New Right’s definition of the family is 
limited to that of the traditional nuclear family—  
father, mother, and biological or adopted children.
A broader definition of family, which would embrace 
alternative lifestyles, does not figure in the New 
Right’s concept of that term. As New Rightist Clyde 
Wilson expressed it, "Alternative lifestyles do not 
constitute emancipation and progress, they constitute 
malignancy." (Wilson, 1982:121) Jerry Falwell decried 
the fact that at the White House Conference on Families 
held in June and July of 1980, the family was eventually 
defined as any persons living together who share 
resources, responsibility for decisions, values and 
goals, and have a commitment to one another over time.
As Falwell noted, this definition would include 
homosexual men, lesbian women, and other people living 
together under the same roof. This definition, according 
to conference participants, better reflected the
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existing differences in family structure and lifestyles.
But Falwell does not accept this new definition:
When a man and woman come to a marriage 
altar and are legally and spiritually 
united, a family has been born. When 
children are born or adopted into that 
union the family is being enlarged. And 
that is simply what a family is. You 
cannot recreate what God has established.
God did not make a mistake when He created 
Adam and Eve and brought them together to 
become one flesh. (Falwell., 1980:133-34)
And when delegates at the Conference endorsed the right
to abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, nondiscrimination
against homosexuals, national health insurance and a
guaranteed annual income of $13^000 for a family of
four, many of the pro-family coalition members walked
out of the meeting in protest. They refused, in
Viguerie’s words, "to be part of such a Big Brother
approach to the problems of the American family."
(Viguerie, 1981:158)
The family, In the New Right view, is strictly
relegated to the dictates of God. God made the family;
as Falwell says, "The home was the first institution
established by God." (Falwell, 1980:1-2) The family is
a natural unit; it is timeless; it is ahistorical. In
contrast to the New Right’s view that the family is a
"natural biological unit", an entity that exists
essentially outside of history, feminists and other
progressives contend that the traditional family is:
a social, economic, political and 
cultural unit of a society. It is 
historical in its formation, not a 
simple biological unit. Like women’s 
roles, the family is not ’natural’: 
it reflects particular relations of 
the society, particular needs to 
be filled. (Eisenstein, 1979:48)
The religious Right takes the lead in extolling
the virtues of the family and in identifying and opposing
those elements which pose , in their view, the biggest
threat to the family: feminism, homosexuality and abortion.
"It is now time" writes Falwell, "to take a stand on
certain moral issues. We must stand against the Equal
Rights Amendment, the feminist revolution, and the
homosexual revolution." (Falwell, 1980:19) Opposition
to these issues all become "moral" issues mandated by
the teachings of the Bible— teachings often according
to the interpretations of Falwell and other fundamentalist
preachers.
Like all conservative movements, the pro-family 
movement seeks to strengthen "authority"— especially 
the authority of parents over their children and husbands 
over their wives. The necessity of authority and 
submission to authority are themes that run strong in 
pro-family literature, and they are often justified by 
Biblical teachings. "As a family, they Qnan and woman^J 
are in submission to the Lordship of Jesus Christ."
(Falwell, 1980:122) And from that primary relationship 
to Christ, a natural hierarchy follows: women are to be
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subordinate to their husbands, and children to their 
parents. In the Christian home, wives are to be 
submissive to their husbands.
The New Right wants to strengthen the family, 
but their concept of the family does not include the 
plurality of forms of personal life that feminists and 
other progressives intend by that Concept. While the 
latter embrace a diversity of family relationships which 
would include couples living or not living together, 
homosexual and lesbian relationships, single parenthood, 
extended kin groups, communal living arrangements, etc., 
the New Right’s definition of the family is strictly 
limited to the traditional family. And yet, as has 
been noted, the type of family the New Right would like 
to restore and strengthen— and through legislation such 
as the Family Protection Act, impose on those who do not 
conform to it— has been becoming less and less the norm 
in America.
Central to the New Right world view is the 
nuclear family as its basic social unit. The model of 
the New Right family is decidedly married and heterosexual 
and it espouses a very traditional view of women and 
families.
New Right leaders envision a world whereby 
’family’ means a male bread-winner, a 
female homemaker and two or three reverent 
children. Family relationships are to be 
understood by rigidly defined sex roles that 
subordinate women as wives and mothers in the
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domestic sphere. Women are passive, 
dependent, self-sacrificing and ever- 
nurturing; men are the undisputed 
heads of the household— authoritarian, 
aggressive, individualist and in total 
control of their property (i.e. their 
wives and children). In addition, New 
Right philosophy supports very 
conservative sexual values, putting 
forth a restricted and unhealthy model 
of female sexuality. Sex is only 
appropriate within a heterosexual 
marriage, and then only for procreation.
The suppression of teenage sexuality 
also part of their moral code. This 
view of sex roles and sexual repression 
demands that women know their places 
and stay there. (Cole, 1981:7)
Abortion
While the pro-family movement has been the 
cutting edge of the New Right politics, abortion is 
the issue on which the New Right has primarily 
consolidated its power thus far. Many political observers 
consider the anti-abortionists to be the politically most 
successful of the single-issue groups. (Crotty, 1980:1*10) 
Antiabortion ideology often becomes the basis 
for a much broader program to restore conservative 
ideas and practices regarding the family and sexuality. 
"What the right-to-life movement has managed to put 
together on the abortion issue is only a sample of what 
is to come when the full range of family and education 
issues becomes the focus of debate in the 1980s," says 
Paul Weyrich. (Conservative Digest, 8/79:18)
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New Right antiabortion groups such as the American
Life Lobby* the Life Amendment Political Action
Committee and the National Pro-Life Committee are closely
linked through interlocking directorates with New Right
political groups such as the American Conservative
Union* Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress*
and Conservative Caucus. They share supplies* people*
money and organizations. (Symmer* 1981:39) Viguerie*
Weyrich* Phillips and most of the congressional Right
have all occupied leadership positions on anti-abortion
political action committees. (Oliker* 1981:81)
Women who favor abortion are viewed as selfish;
they are saying that "self-satisfaction is more important
than the family." (Falwell* 1980:124) The fear of
womenTs "right to choose"* argues Stacey Oliker* runs
deep in right-to-lifers:
Henry HydeTs warnings that mothers have 
become the adversaries of their 
children* for example* speaks to deep 
fears of the effect of women’s liberation 
on women’s commitments to nurture and 
sacrifice for their children and 
husbands. Won’t exposing the often 
conflicting interests of women and 
children* and empowering women to ’choose’ 
be the end of maternal altruism?
Ken* children and women* too* look to 
women for nurturance and sacrifice.
Abortion evokes the fear that if women
can choose* won’t they choose over
and over again ’not to’? (Oliker* 1981:85)
Under the banner of "protecting the fetuses*"
New Right/pro-family antiabortion forces have waged a
well-financed* well-organized assault on abortion
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rights. Closer examination shows that opposition to
abortion often has more to do with fear of women’s
independence, sexual liberation, declining parental
authority, and marital and familial instability than it
does with concern for protecting the fetus.
The contemporary antiabortion movement 
arose in response neither to the 
existence of abortions nor to an increase 
in their number. It arose in response 
to the legalization of abortion. It is 
this legitimation, more than the act of 
abortion itself, that threatens 
traditional social and sexual values...
Opposition to abortion is part of a 
larger opposition to changes in family 
relations, sexual mores, and the status 
of women. (Hunter, 1981:132)
The Quixote Center, a Catholic community based in
Washington, D.C., conducted a study of Catholics opposed
to abortion and found that many in the movement saw
abortion at the deepest psychological level "less as a
taking of a human life than as a practice threatening to
existing social patterns and customs in families,
marriages, and sexual relations.” (Wohl, 1979-58-59)
Dr. J.C. Wilke, president of the National Right to Life
Committee, articulated the fear that abortion rights
threaten the authority of the husband when he stated
that abortion rights ”do violence to marriage by helping
to remove the right of a husband to protect the life of
the child he has fathered in his wife’s womb." (Petchesky,
1981:221)
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Abortion rights strike a blow at the natural unity
of sex, procreation, and the family. Dr. Bernard
Nathanson, cofounder of the National Association for
Repeal of Abortion laws alluded to this concern in his
criticism of earlier Supreme Court decisions which in
1976 threw out statutes in Missouri requiring a husband’s
consent for abortion, and in 1979 threw out the
Massachusetts law that required parental consultation
or notification:
The state, through the decree of the 
Supreme Court, has become a willing 
party to the dissolution of the family 
on the consent question. On abortion, 
it has taken an adversary position on the 
formation of new families. And it 
takes an adversary position against 
the family as the stabilizing unit within 
society. Pregnancy and childbirth are 
cohesive in their effect on the family, 
while sex, apart from the family and 
childbearing, is never socially cohesive; 
on the contrary, it is a chaotic 
force. (Falwell, 1980:172)
Some pro-family forces also fear that the
legalization of abortion, and its increasing
legitimation, will lead to genetic manipulation,
infanticide, and euthanasia. Dr. Mildred Jefferson,
speaking of Falwell’s "Old-Time Gospel Hour"
articulated this fear:
Today it is the unborn child; tomorrow 
it is likely to be the elderly or 
those who are incurably ill. Who 
knows but that a little later it may 
be anyone who has political or moral 
views that do not fit into the 
distorted new order. (Falwell, 1980:17*0
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Opposition to abortion is also based on the loss of 
parental control over teenage sexual activity, and the 
desire to prevent such activity. The question of 
whether a parent has the right to force an unwanted 
pregnancy on a teenager is "submerged in a cry of 
despair over parental powerlessness and merged with a 
politics of opposing all state intervention into family 
matters." (Oliker, 1981:85)
Of all the feminist demands, it is abortion 
which is viewed by the New Right as most threatening 
to the traditional form of family and to conservative 
sexual values. Abortion rights have come to be 
recognized by advocates and foes alike as a "paradigmatic 
feminist demand." (Petchesky, 1981:210) Historically, 
the control of women is linked to growths in right-wing 
influence and power. (Cooper, 1981:39) Feminists view 
abortion rights as a fundamental requirement for women’s 
liberation, and now more than ever, an uncompromisable 
demand since abortion has become "a wedge for the 
broader right-wing attack." (Oliker, 1981:90)
Homosexuality
In the New Right view, homosexuality represents 
an immoral lifestyle; it results from a loosening of sex 
roles and is reflective of a general degeneration in the 
morals and values of a society. For the religious 
Right, it is, quite simply, a sin. "The sin of
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homosexuality is so grievous, so abominable in the sight 
of God, that He destroyed the cities of Sodom and 
Gomorrah because of this terrible sin." (Falwell, 1980:l8l) 
According to Falwell, homosexual men and lesbian women 
have not accepted their God-given roles as "man" and 
"woman", and thus we have this present moral crisis.
He calls homosexuality "Satan’s diabolical attack upon 
the family." (Falwell, 1980:183) Homosexuality results 
from the absence of strong male leadership in the 
family, and correspondingly, from too much female 
influence. Referring to the feminist movement as 
"unisexual", Falwell says that it has contributed to 
the growth of homosexuality by challenging rigid sex 
roles. Feminists desire to "eliminate God-given 
differences that exist between the sexes; that is why 
they are prohomosexual and lesbian." (Falwell, 1980:185)
The pro-family movement opposes gay rights.
Anita Bryant sparked a nation-wide movement against 
homosexuality called "Save Our Children, Inc." in 
1977 when she led the crusade in Dade County, Florida 
to repeal a gay rights ordinance banning discrimination 
in employment and housing based on a person’s sexual 
preference. In the wake of Bryant’s Dade County victory 
came six other anti-gay victories, and Save Our 
Children, Inc. was involved in each of the campaigns. 
(Crawford, 1980:152-53) Anti-gay activists are 
particularly opposed to the employment of gay teachers
because they feel the teaching of traditional sex roles 
is essential to the survival of the traditional nuclear 
family, and that gay teachers will initiate students 
into a homosexual lifestyle. The following letter from 
Save Our Children, Inc., underlined in red and signed 
by Anita Bryant illustrates the appeals to fear and 
anger that characterizes many New Right fundraising 
letters:
When the homosexuals burn the Holy Bible 
in public...
how can I stand by silently.
Dear Friend:
I don’t hate the homosexuals!
But as a mother I must protect my children 
from their evil influence.
...Do you realize what they want?
They want to recruit our school children 
under the protection of the laws of our land!
(reproduced in Crawford, 1980:52)
The New Right fears that the gay rights movement
will lead to civil rights for homosexuals which will
result in homosexuality increasingly being viewed as an
acceptable, albeit alternative, lifestyle. Says Falwell
...there is a movement for legislation 
that would deem homosexuals as ’normal.’ 
Homosexuality is now presented as an 
alternative life style. Hundreds of 
thousands of men and women in America 
flagrantly boast their sin and march in 
public view. They are an indictment 
against America and are contributing 
to her downfall... . The homosexual 
issue has nothing to do with the issue of 
equal rights for differing groups.
Our constitution holds that all 
men are created equal, but laws are 
made to deal with unequal behavior.
(Falwell, 1980:181-84)
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As with the abortion issue, once homosexuality is 
accpted, it logically follows for the pro-family movement 
that it will pave the way for the acceptance of other 
undesirable behavior: "If homosexuality is deemed
normal, how long will it be before rape, adultery, 
alcoholism, drug addiction, and incest are labeled as 
normal?" (Falwell, 1980:184)
Heterosexuality is a crucial component of the 
New Right family picture. Homosexuality challenges 
the belief that traditional male/female roles, 
heterosexuality and marriage constitute the "natural 
order of things." Gays and lesbians challenge the 
hegemonic nature of the family: by living an alternative
lifestyle they challenge the idea that the traditional 
nuclear family is the only family unit, that hetero­
sexuality is the only pattern for sexual relationships. 
Through its anti-gay campaign, the New Right seeks 
to protect "the social aspects of traditional gender 
identies and particularly the position of male paternal 
and heterosexual authority." (Petchesky, 1981:231) 
Homosexuality throws into question the
very idea of what it means to be a 'man* 
or a ’woman’, and the structure and 
meaning of the traditional family.
These two concepts are clearly related, 
for the meaning of ’masculinity’ (as of 
’femininity’ — that is, of gender itself—  
has been defined historically through 
the structure of the family and dominant 
position of the father within it.
(Petchesky, 1981:231)
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As with abortion, it appears that the anti­
homosexual movement is largely a response to the growing 
visibility, and to some extent, legitimation, of 
homosexuality. When gay people remained in the "closet", 
i.e. remained invisible, the hegemonic nature of the 
family and sexual relationships could remain intact.
But once gay people no longer, in Falwell's words, 
remained a "quiet minority" but rather became a very 
"vocal minority demanding to be accepted as a legitimate 
minority", they had gone too far. (Falwell, 1980:183)
The Family Protection Act
In response to what they view as the ever-growing 
threats to the family— abortion, homosexuality, divorce, 
etc.--the New Right has sponsored the Family Protection 
Act, a comprehensive piece of legislation which they 
hope would counteract disruptive intervention of the 
federal government into family life, and encourage the 
restoration of the traditional nuclear family. An omnibus 
bill setting forth the pro-family agenda, the Act was 
drafted by Paul Weyrich and his associates. Everything 
in the bill, says Falwell, "supports traditional values, 
encourages families to stay together, upholds parental 
authority, and reinforces traditional husband-and-wife 
relationships." (Falwell, 1980:136-37) The Family 
Preotection Act, says Viguerie, "would make wholesome 
family life a national priority"; it would "reestablish
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the family as the basic unit of strength for America." 
(Viguerie, 1981:154-55)
The Family Protection Act illustrates the New 
Right’s attempt to translate its political/moral agenda 
into legislation, and it offers a comprehensive view of 
where the pro-family movement would like to go. The Act 
has not passed in its entire form, and because it is such 
a broad piece of legislation, it is considered unlikely 
that it will pass as a total package. However, by 
breaking the bill down, they have enhanced its chances 
of passage by proposing many of the individual points 
separately and thus diffusing the energies of the 
opposition. It is likely that the Family Protection Act 
will be a springboard for future legislative action. As 
Viguerie anticipates, "The act will be a benchmark for 
years to come for the kind of sensible actions the federal 
government should be taking to preserve traditional 
family values in America." (Viguerie, 1981:154)
The Family Protection Act has been called the 
pro-family coalition’s "blueprint for a Moral America" 
and can be considered a paradigm for the New Right’s 
pro-family politics. First introduced into Congress by 
Paul Laxalt (Republican-Nevada), its goals, as stated 
in the legislative statement of purpose, are to 
"strengthen the American Family and to remove those 
Federal government policies which inhibit its strength
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and prosperity." The major provisions of the bill have 
to do with education, domestic relations, welfare and 
taxation. Specific provisions promote a public policy 
favoring marriage, childbirth, heterosexuality and the 
role of the husband as household head. The provisions 
include:
• the witholding of federal funds from any 
program which fails to notify parents before providing 
contractption, abortion or abortion counseling to 
unmarried minors. It also punishes by a $5,000 fine, any 
program which fails to notify parents within twenty-four 
hours of the commencement of treatment for veneral 
disease.
• It excludes homosexuals from Title VII and
prohibits any agency of the federal government from
enforcing non-discrimination in favor of such individuals.
It denies funds to
any public or private individual, group, 
foundation, commission, corporation, 
association, or other entity which 
presents homosexuality, male or female, 
as an acceptable alternative life style 
or suggests that it can be an acceptable 
life style. (Title V, Sec. 507)
• It would prohibit federal funding to:
any program which produces or promotes 
courses of instruction or curriculum 
seeking to inculcate values or modes 
of behavior which contradict the 
demonstrated beliefs and values of 
the community. (Title I, Sec. 101)
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It would also prohibit federal funding to any program 
which supports educational materials or studies which 
would "tend to denigrate, diminish, or deny the role 
differences between the sexes as it has been historically 
understood in the United States." (Title I, Sec. 101) 
Through its "states’ rights" strategy, the 
Family Protection Act would use the elimination of 
federal funding as a tool to implement the New Right's 
ideology, and "as punishment for the failure of any 
state to conform to this ideology." (Schulman, 1981:5)
Reprivit ization
The New Right advocates the separation between the
private and the public spheres and puts forth the view
that it is a natural dichotomy. They seek to
reprivatize especially those areas where women and minority
groups have managed to bring some modicum of reform
through struggle over the past couple of decades.
Joined by major segments of the corporate, 
capitalist and state power structures, 
the New Right is trying to designate 
the private as ’private’ once again, but 
in a particular sense. The aim is 
surely to reprivatize every domain of 
social, public intervention that has 
been created through the struggles of 
working people, blacks, the poor, and 
women for the last twenty years. Not 
only abortion, sex education, and 
domestic violence services, but health 
care, education, the right to equal 
education, legal services, health and 
safety at work, access to the broadcasting 
media are all being pushed back into the 
unregulated anarchy of the private sector.
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The legitimation for this massive 
attempt to destroy the meager reforms 
that were won from the liberal state in 
the 1960s and 70s is the myth of 
'privatism'— the idea that what's wrong 
with busing or medicaid abortions or 
the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) or the Environ­
mental Protection Agency is that the 
federal government is "meddling in our 
'private' business"; that, indeed there 
even exists some private, safe, secure 
place— our neighborhoods, our churches, 
above all the family--that would give 
us everything we needed if only the 
government would stay out. (Petchesky,
1981:223-24)
The New Right says it wants to get government off 
the backs of the people; and yet, it proposes and 
supports legislation such as the Human Life Amendment 
which would make abortion illegal, thus denying women 
the personal freedom to choose when and if they want to 
have children. The Family Protection Act is supposed to 
protect the family from government interference, and 
yet, under this program "government would inevitably be 
more than ever inserted into the private lives and 
values of individuals, through a kind of moral police." 
(Petchesky, 1981:226) For instance, the bill would 
eliminate many existing feminist and gay rights programs 
which rely heavily on federal funding. It would require 
parental notification prior to teenager's receiving 
birth control or abortion services and veneral disease 
treatment. The social and political impact of these 
provisions would restrict peoples' sexual and political
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activities. And yet, for the New Right, there is no
contradiction. The State would not be interfering but
rather protecting the family— which is a "natural” unit--
from "unnatural" influences, e.g. abortion, homosexuality,
premarital sex.
...the right’s attitude toward the state, 
in its ’new right’ form, is commonly taken 
to be contradictory— calling on the one hand 
for diminished state economic involvement 
and social welfare policy; yet seeming 
to affirm a growing repressive intervention 
into social life (against abortion, for 
example).
For the new right discourse, there is no 
logical contradiction; the state should 
not intervene, but instead secure the 
existence of ’natural’ nonpolitical 
processes, through coercion if necessary.
Thus the state should maintain the 
conditions necessary for the operations 
of markets and maintain the conditions 
necessary for the flourishing of 
traditional family and social relation­
ships, by barring disruptive influences.
Though this image of ’natural’ 
economic processes and social/familial 
community is, for the left, a massive 
distortion, it is possible for the right 
to construct a coherent anti-statist 
discourse that fuses opposition to 
state economic regulation and to 
egalitarian social policies regarding 
women— in both cases asserting the 
ideal of an autonomous, natural order 
prior to the states disruption.
(Plotke, 1981:3^)
If the New Right is successful, issues related to the
family would once again be depoliticized; they would
be relegated to tradition, custom— to the "implicit
natural rules of the game." (Hunter, 1981:135)
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Petchesky also argues that the New Right1s demand
for privacy and its call for an end to state interference
in the personal realm, e.g. the family, is actually made
on behalf of corporate bodies rather than individuals.
For instance, one of the provisions of the Family
Protection Act (Sec. 301) would establish the immunity
of all religious and other private welfare and education
programs from any federal government supervision. In
this view, privacy becomes a corporate attribute,
rather than one belonging to individuals as persons.
Although the language of New Right 
ideology evokes the sentiment of personal 
freedom from state interference, what 
distinguishes that ideology from 
classical conservatism is that it is 
spoken on behalf of corporate bodies 
rather than individuals. It is, in 
other words, corporate privatism— in 
the service of business, church, private 
school, and patriarchal family— that 
is intended, not individual privacy.
(Petchesky, 1981:224)
CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW RIGHT: BEYOND 1980
The 1982 Elections
The 1982 elections were significant for the 
conservative movement. For the New Right, they would 
show whether they would maintain and continue to build 
on the strength of the conservative coalition that they 
had forged. For the Republican Party, which was the 
chief beneficieary of the conservative movement's success, 
the 1982 mid-term elections were to be a test of whether 
a new realignment had occurred in 1980 (as had happened 
with Franklin Roosevelt's Democratic Party in 1934), or 
whether their victory, too, was temporary. 1982 would 
show whether the electorate would vote to continue the 
trend of 1982. (Judis, 1983:25)
Setback for Conservatism
The elections proved a setback for the conservative 
movement— both in and out of the Republican Party. 
Twenty-six Republicans were removed from Congress, a 
substantial loss, especially in view of the fact that 
it was the first off-year election with their party's 
president in power. Of thirty-six contested governor­
ships, Republicans won only nine. The New Right
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suffered even more serious blows. Of the fourteen 
Senatorial candidates targeted by Terry Dolan's 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(NCPAC), only one— Howard Cannon of Nevada— was defeated. 
Jesse Helm's Congressional Club in North Carolina lost 
all six of the races it targeted. And in West Virginia 
and Alabama, the two Republicans elected in 1980, who 
were most closely identified with the Moral Majority 
(David Stanton and Albert Smith) lost heavily to 
Democratic challengers. (Judis, 1983:26)
In the referendum balloting, however, the New 
Right fared better. Though it did po.orly on the nuclear 
issue (nuclear freeze referenda won in all but one of 
the nine states and all but two of the forty towns and 
cities where they were on the ballot), the New Right won 
on most other issues, including gun control, bottle- 
deposit, and taxation restraint proposals.
In 1978, columnist David Broder, while commenting 
on the problem of low and declining voter participation, 
remarked that perhaps the best prescription would be a 
good dose of conservative government. (Gans, 1983:11) 
Whether or not it was because of a "good dose of 
conservative government", the 1982 election did, for the 
first time in two decades, result in an increased 
voter turnout in a mid-term election, reversing, at least 
temporarily, a twenty year trend in declining voter 
participation. Curtis B. Gans, director of the Committee
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for the study of the American Electorate* made these
observations about the 1982 elections:
First* this was an election of anger.
The increases in turnout and the turn­
around in seats in the House and state 
houses were caused by fear among blacks 
and working class voters about the 
impact of Reaganomics on their lives* 
livelihoods and aspirations.
Second* the principal victim was the 
far right. It is unlikely that that 
force will disappear as long as the 
fundamentalism upon which it is based 
remains a part of American life* but 
it is virtually certain that its 
issues— abortion* gun control* school 
prayer and busing— will not be at the 
center of the American agenda in the 
near future.
Third* the 1980 Reagan "mandate" was 
obviously personal rather than 
programmatic. The President did not 
suffer a repudiation on the scale 
of Johnson’s in 1966 or Nixon’s in 
197^* but the electorate made it 
clear that there was no mandate for 
dismantling detente* emasculating 
environmental regulation or reducing 
government services. (Gans* 1983:12)
Those were the immediate messages of the 1982 election*
says Gans. The long-term message of the 1982 elections*
he contends* is that both major political parties are
in trouble. It is virtually inconceivable* he says*
that the Republicans can hold onto their national power
without an upturn in the economy. And as for the
Democrats* they fared better in 1982* not on their own
merit* but simply because Reagan’s policies defeated
themselves. "If the economy had not been in trouble"
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observes Gans* "they would have emerged from this election 
empty-handed." (Gans* 1983:13) He predicts that the 
Democratic Party will move to 1984 as it did in the past 
election* hoping for the Republicans to defeat themselves* 
and it is quite possible that the Democrats will win. 
However*
the only sustaining basis for continued 
increased turnout and the renewed 
vitality of the American political 
system is the hope that government and 
politics can produce programmatic 
answers to the political* social and 
economic problems of most Americans.
(Gans, 1983:13)
Grounds for that hope* he commented* were not evidenced
in the 1982 elections.
The New Right faulted Reagan’s "stay the course"
strategy* and the White House’s "abandonment" of the
conservative movement* for the 1982 election upset. By
deliberately distancing himself from the New Right* Reagan
turned his back on the very people whose support elected
him into office* they contend. Disheartened by Reagan’s
"lip service" to social issues* the Moral Majority took
a far less active role in the 1982 elections than they
did in 1980. (Conservative Digest* 12/82:56) Many of the
conservative activists who enthusiastically worked for
the Reagan/Republican team in 1980* sat this election out*
unimpressed with the Reagan term. Even before the 1982
election* New Right members were expressing their
dissatisfaction with Reagan. They attacked his appoint-
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ments (for example* Sandra Day O ’Connor’s appointment 
to the U.S. Supreme Court infuriated pro-family/anti­
abortion activists because of O ’Connor's past support 
for abortion rights); his failure to make enough budget 
cuts; his "sell out" to China* his "acquiesence" in 
SALT II* and his failure to make serious efforts to 
abolish the Cabinet level Departments of Energy and 
Education* and his mere "token" support of the New Right 
social agenda. (Conservative Digest* 12/82:56; Judis* 
1983:26) Reagan lost hundreds of thousands of campaign 
volunteers:
In 1980* millions of conservatives* 
born-again Christians switched their 
votes from Democrat to Republican. But 
in 1982* the White House apparently 
decided to purposely not go after these 
votes again. As a result* many of the 
hundreds of thousands of volunteers who 
made the 1980 campaign a crusade were 
less inclined this year to spend the 
countless hours making telephone calls* 
addressing envelopes* knocking on doors* 
putting up signs* etc. (Conservative Digest, 
12/82:56)
The New Right faults Reagan with his making "Reaganomics" 
the referendum question of the election. For the 
Democrats* that meant blaming unemployment* high interest 
rates and economic stagnation on Reagan and the 
Republican Party. "Economics" was the key issue in 
1982 as it was in 1980. However* in 1980 it was Carter 
and the Democratic Party that were associated with the 
nation’s economic ills. Many blue-collar Democrats* 
drawn to Reagan’s articulation of social conservatism*
100.
and disillusioned with Carter and liberalism* switched
party lines in the hope that Reagan’s supply-side
economics would work. However* in 1982 many voters
found that they were no better off than they were in
1980. And since people tend to be more interested in
"bread and butter" issues in times of austerity than in
social issues* the Republican Party could not hold the
support of the Democratic blue-collar workers. The
Republican Party found itself in a weakened position:
The Republican Party was branded with the 
one stigma it can least endure: the party
of hard times. The tide of right-wing 
populist resentment against elitist 
control of the government and interference 
into their own lives was obliterated by 
the pain of unemployment. Conservative 
politicians who had struck a resonant 
chord with with blue collar workers’ 
anger over busing* welfare and crime 
failed to respond to that worker’s 
economic torment. (Conservative Digest 
12/82:56)
Instead of making Reaganomics the referendum question* 
the Republicans should have made the election a 
referendum on liberalism. The Republicans should have 
taken the offensive* says Viguerie* and let "the liberal 
Democrats try to explain their opposition to constitutional 
amendments to restore prayer in public schools* to require 
balanced federal budgets and to prohibit forced busing 
of school children." (Conservative Digest* 12/82:56) 
Instead* the Administration allowed "liberal Democrats 
to establish the ground rules and the framework of the 
election." (Conservative Digest* 12/82:13)
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Paul Weyrich concedes that the New Right must
share some of the blame for the 1982 election results.
Once conservatives were elected to office* the New Right
began playing the "Washington game":
It is so easy* once life eases up* to 
forget what you learned in the trenches.
We did just that. When a President who 
ran as a conservative was elected and the 
conservatives increased their strength in 
the House and the Republicans won control 
of the Senate* we immediately adjusted.
No one ever said as much* but we fell 
into playing the Washington game. Were 
we out in the countryside creating the 
issues? No* we thought the administration 
would do that. Were we making the 
liberals pay for what they were doing?
No* we were sure that sooner or later the 
administration would do that. The things 
we did between 1977-1980* which produced 
all of those ’surprise’ victories* were 
not done in the last two years. In the 
meanwhile* we were busy playing games with 
the administration* none of which ever 
amounted to a hill of beans. (Conservative 
Digest* 12/82:9)
Realignment or Dealignment?
In the wake of the 1980 elections* with Reagan’s 
victory and the large number of Republican congressional 
gains* it was widely speculated that a realignment in 
American politics had occurred* and that conservatives 
would control the new political system. Reagan’s victory 
was often compared to Franklin Roosevelt’s* suggesting 
that a similar realignment had occurred for the Republican 
Party as it did for the Democrats in the 1930s when 
Roosevelt* by adopting the more popular side of the issue
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of government intervention in the economy* broke the
35-40 year dominance of the Republican Party and in turn
ushered in a long period of Democratic dominance.
(Douglas* 1981:174)
According to this speculation of a new realignment*
1982 was to be a "key" or what V.O. Key* Jr. termed in
1955* a "critical election"— a "type of election in which
there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment
between parties." (Douglas* 1981:173) Sundquist (1973)
defines the process of realignment in such a critical or
key election as one in which:
the composition of the parties (even the 
identity of one) and the character of the 
political struggle between them was 
altered fundamentally so that the country 
passed from one distinct national party 
system to another. (Sundquist* 1973 •* 28)
However* the 1982 election results ended
speculation about realignment. It seems more appropriate
to speak of the "continuing dealignment of the American
party structure." (Chapin* 1983:6) (emphasis added)
Dealignment suggests a general loosening of partisan
loyalties which is confirmed by Crotty and Jacobson
(1980) in their analysis of party identification. Their
research shows that personal identification with a party
is becoming less common and less important.
Fewer people are identifying with either 
of the political parties* and even 
among those who do* the intensity of 
their identification is falling off 
markedly. As a consequence* party 
identification has become less
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meaningful for predicting the vote.
Loyalty to a party and its candidates 
had declined seriously. (Crotty* 1980:27)
They note further that this trend of weakened party
identification has affected the two parties differently.
The Democratic party's coalition* being "considerably
larger" and far more malleable than the Republican's*
means that "the larger Democratic coalition is far more
likely to defect than is the smaller group of Republican
identifiers." (Crotty* 1980:29;32)
Polls of voters exiting from the voting booths
in 1980 identified those who turned from Carter to Reagan.
The majority were "white and male and they came from
traditionally Democratic ranks* union members* Catholics
and southerners." (Scammon* 1983:24) These Democratic
defectors rejected Carter* shared Reagan's conservatism
on social issues* and hoped that Reagan's economic
policies would succeed where Carter's failed. However*
their return to the Democratic ranks in the 1982 elections
indicated that their defection represented continued party
dealignment rather than realignment. This trend of
party dealignment increased with the rise of single-issue
groups in the late 1970s. "As people become active in
single-issue campaigns* they often abandon their old
party affiliations en route." (Davis* 1981:45) In 1980
this trend benefitted the Republicans; in 1982 it did
not.
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The New Populism
The New Right rose to prominence through its 
ability to mobilize and draw into its organizational 
network, the constituencies of the single-issue groups 
that mushroomed in this country during the 1970s. As 
Viguerie recalls, "Conservatives suddenly started to win 
elections by attracting people who are interested in what 
are now called ’single issues.’" (Conservative Digest, 10/82:2) 
Through New Right organizing efforts, the anti-gay/ERA/ 
abortion/gun control and pro-school prayer constituencies 
developed into a powerful pro-family coalition that 
helped propel Reagan and the Republicans to victory in the 
1980 elections.
The New Right and' the conservative movement, however, 
suffered a setback at the polls during the 1982 election. 
Knowing that political power can be transitory, the New 
Right has changed its electoral strategy and shifted 
its focus to a new set of issues. For example, the National 
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), which 
relied heavily on "hit lists" and tough, negative 
advertising against liberal politicians, has announced its 
plans to "accentuate the positive" in 1984 and to emphasize 
positive ads. While the "tough" tactics of NCPAC appeared 
to serve the New Right and the conservative cause well in 
1980, it did not prove successful in the 1982 elections 
and thus NCPAC is switching tactics for the 1984 elections. 
NCPAC Chairperson, Terry Dolan, has stated that while
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NCPAC will still target liberal candidates for defeat 
in 1984* most of its efforts will be geared toward the 
presidential campaigns. Its plans include the recruiting 
of one million volunteers* organizing rallies* producing 
a thirty minute television documentary* and launching a 
$5 million "American Heroes for Reagan" campaign aimed 
at reelecting the president. (Peterson* 1983:A6)
Likewise* the Moral Majority plans to mount 
"positive" campaigns in the 1984 congressional races.
For example* it is now discouraging efforts to censor books 
in local libraries* and instead* is seeking to get more 
conservative religious books put on the library shelves.
As Moral Majority Vice President Cal Thomas explains this 
shift:
I think a positive campaign will work.
We need to stay away from inflammatory 
rhetoric* like calling people who 
support legalized abortion ’murderers 
and baby killers.’ Negative campaigns 
contribute to a lack of discourse and 
stereotyping of issues. That’s hurt 
us in the past. (Peterson* 1983:A6)
Even more significant than the New Right's campaign 
tactics is the effort by New Right leaders to recast them­
selves as "new populists." The entire October* 1982 
issue of the Conservative Digest was devoted to propound­
ing the "new populism" politics. Defining the New 
Populist revolt as an uprising against big banks* big 
labor* big government and media elitists* Viguerie 
remarked: "This is the most significant development
among conservatives since the New Right." (Peterson, 1983)
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Sensing a growing populist constituency, the New
Right hopes to give conservative direction to the "millions 
of Americans who feel that neither liberals nor conservatives,
Democrats nor Republicans really care about their concerns,
The New Right's coalition of single-issue groups proved 
very successful early in the New Right's political life. 
However, as Viguerie noted:
This coalition has been a success. But 
unless a new coalition develops and 
continues to build upon the one the 
Conservative Movement built, our success 
could become just a flash in American 
history. (Conservative Digest, 10/82:2)
Viguerie has high hopes for the conservative New Populist 
coalition, believing that it can "govern at local, state 
and national levels far into the 21st century" if it joins 
with "tens of millions of angry and frustrated Americans." 
(Conservative Digest, 10/82:2) These Americans are angry, 
he says, because of high crime rates, drugs, Internal 
Revenue Service rules, high taxes, illegal aliens and high 
interest rates. They are angry at the liberal establishment, 
says Viguerie, for
getting us in a no-win land war in Vietnam, 
keeping God and religion off network 
produced TV shows, sending our tax money to 
countries that despise us, trade agreements 
that keep American products out of foreign 
countries. (Conservative Digest, 10/82:3)
Harry Boyte, a leftist political activist, describes the 
populist mood in the United States less specifically:
A deep sense of grievance is felt by 
millions of formerly silent citizens - 
skepticism about all large institutions 
coupled with the feeling that an 
unresponsive and arrogant elite has
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dishonored and exploited the American 
people and their traditions and values.
This sense of aggrieved peoplehood is 
at the center of a populist mood.
(Boyte, 1980:38)
Burton Pines, research director of the Heritage 
Foundation, observes what he labels "traditionalist" 
tendencies reemerging in industry, religion, education 
and other areas of American life. If the various grass­
roots elements of these traditionalist movements are to 
become a significant political force, they need to come 
together. If the conservative movement is to martial 
these grassroots elements, contends Pines, it will require 
a "concerted effort by the various strands of the Tradit­
ionalist leadership: the New Right, the Religious Right,
the neo-conservatives and the old conservatives." 
(Conservative Digest, 11/82:36)
Conservative writer Kevin Phillips sees the 
emergence of "middle class radicalism" arising from an 
angered and frustrated middle class that has "lost its 
party moorings"— a group that has broken its long-term 
relationship with the Democratic Party and yet is 
disillusioned by Republican economics. (Conservative 
Digest, 10/82:30) The Reagan administration, contends 
Weyrich, is viewed by many as being pro-management as 
well as pro-business. It is seen as having a "do- 
nothing" economic philosophy, which has caused blue- 
collar workers to estrange themselves from the Repub­
lican administration.
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Says Weyrich,
These workers don't want the federal 
government Imposing all sorts of controls...
But the workers want to see an activist 
presidency. We all know Franklin Roosevelt 
didn't do anything to solve the depression.
But he was given high marks for trying. 
(Conservative Digest, 10/82:59)
Looking ahead to the near future, Pines envisions
that conservative populism.will play a decisive role in 
politics. He writes,
...by the 1990s the balance of power could 
rest with a populist or corporatist brand 
of conservatism that combines business 
interests with blue-collar electorates into 
this group - crime, race, nationalism. 
Protectionism and immigration are also 
issues unions share with conservatives.
This aggregation would support activist 
government on economic matters, aiding 
troubled industries and farmers, while at 
the same time adhering to a relatively 
conservative position on moral issues. 
(Conservative Digest, 10/82:30)
?he New Right realizes the political significance
of the growing populist sentiment and of the importance 
of filling the leadership role for the movement. 
Conservative Robert J. Hoy believes the New Right is in 
the best position to fill the leadership rolej
Populist America today lacks political 
leaders of its own. Its power is currently 
undirected and dissipated. Therein lies 
the great challenge and opportunity for the 
New Right, which is the only political 
current in a position to concentrate and 
direct that power. (Hoy, 1982:102)
In the October, 1982 issue of the Conservative Digest,
Viguerie outlined "Ten Populist Proposals for America."
The proposals are: 1) a flat-rate tax to replace the
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progressive income tax; 2) limited terms for Federal 
judges; 3) reform of Civil Service laws to ’’ensure that 
bureaucrats are accountable to the American people through 
the President”; 4) a halt to illegal aliens; 5) tax 
credits for private schools; 6) compensation for crime 
victims; 7) support for the sagebrush rebellion, to free 
up for development the millions of acres in Western 
United States now owned by the federal government; 8) the 
right of "item veto" for the President which would allow 
the President the authority to veto specific parts of 
bills passed by Congress; 9) restrictions of foreign 
competition; and, 10) the halting of special privileges 
for Congress. (Conservative Digest, 10/82:10)
^Noticeably absent from the New Right’s populist 
proposals are the social issues which propelled it into 
the forefront of American politics only a few years ago: 
abortion, homosexuality, school prayer, and other "pro- 
family" issues^] As Viguerie explains this change, the 
"New Right agenda and issues took us a long way, but 
we have to add something to the mix." (Peterson, 1983:A6) 
When the proposed constitutional Amendment to ban 
abortions was defeated in June, 1983* Senator Hatch, 
the Amendment1s principal sponsor remarked, "Frankly,
I'm going on to other issues." (Dewar, 1983:A1)
The populist tradition in this country is most 
often associated with the agrarian revolts of the late 
19th century. Pope (1982) describes the early movement as
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an exciting story of ordinary people, 
people who had once thought there was no 
way out of their desperate plight, who 
then began to realize their combined 
strength, their growing self-respect as 
they fought against powers that seemed 
omnipotent. (Pope, 1982:140)
This "story” is similar to that articulated by New Right
populists. The image of the "little guy" struggling against
entrenched bureaucracies and ruling elites is invoked.
One feature of the New Right’s use of tradition is that
many of its symbols and images are abstract. They lack
detail.
The abstractness of the symbols and images 
the New Right uses is ’functional’ because 
it allows people in different classes, 
subcultures, regions, and religions to fill 
in the details from their own relevant 
sets of experiences. (Hunter, 1981:133)
Much of the imagery and ideology of the New Right’s
populism is vague, as was their pro-family ideology which
subsequently appealed to many different sectors of people.
The image of the family, articulated by the New Right,
allowed
social conservatives among isolated 
suburbanites, working-class city dwellers, 
rural whites, Mormons, Catholics and 
Protestants all to see their idealized 
families in the ideology and imagery of 
the New Right. (Hunter, 1981:133)
Likewise, the New Right’s populist rhetoric is sufficiently
vague to appeal to sectors of the population not traditionally
conservative. For example, New Rightist Congressperson,
Jack Kemp (Republican-New York) vaguely defines populism
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as "optimism about people and their willingness to respond
to economic incentives as well as their ability to best
control their own and their families’ destinies." He
says that he is a populist because he believes in freedom
and democracy. (Conservative Digest, 10/82:9) And while
populism is generally associated with "progressive" or
"liberal" politics, John "Terry" Dolan explains that there
are elements of populism which fit. in well with a "new
conservative majority agenda."
One of the underpinnings of populism is 
its suspicion and opposition to ’bigness,’ 
something thoroughly consistent with 
conservative thought. (Conservative Digest,
10/82:58)
The populist approach is also associated with
democratic mass movements and direct democracy. Traditionally,
conservatives have taken a dim view of direct methods of
democracy, "seeking instead to channel majority will through
a complex arrangement of institutions that moderate the
voice of the people." (Crawford, 5/80:2) The New Right
departs from traditional conservatism in this respect:
the New Right, impatient for short-run results, 
has rejected this dominant theme of 
conservatism in favor of direct democracy.
It is their belief that more and more issues should 
be decided by ’the people’ through the ballot 
box rather than by their elected represent­
atives or by intentionally unrepresentative 
institutions such as the courts. (Crawford, 5/80:20)
Initiatives and referenda are popular vehicles of
populism. The beginnings of the expression of the current
populist sentiment has been associated with the "tax
revolt" in 1978 in California with Proposition 13, when
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a tax-cutting measure was put on the ballot because 
1.2 million people signed a petition to put it there. 
Citizen initiatives of the 1970s received widest play 
on the issue of homosexual rights. Of the six anti-gay 
rights referenda in 1977 and 1978, the cause of civil 
rights for gay people lost in all but one. (Crawford, 
5/82:3)
The New Right prefers direct voter participation
in matters often left to the legislative branch. Alan
Crawford observes that by attempting to limit the
judicial and legislative functions, the New Right leaves
only "the executive branch and ’the people’, no checks,
no balances— the exact contrary of the eighteenth
century conservatives who worked out the Constitution."
(Crawford, 5/80:6) This sets up a model in which there
is an expansive presidency whose power is limited only
by the "will of the people."
A country in which highly sensitive 
questions are settled by continual 
referenda would be one of constant moral 
contention. The New Rightists seem to 
prefer the fanatics and demagogues—  
the Anita Bryants, Howard Jarvises, 
and John Briggses— to the reasoned, 
responsible leadership associated with 
classic conservatism. (Crawford, 5/80:9)
Already, notes Crawford, such sensitive personal
questions as abortion and homosexuality are put to the
public for its approval. He fears that the Right,
through the leadership of the New Right, is moving
from a "traditional conservative defense of representative
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government against the onslaughts of direct democracy 
into a celebration of government by rabble-rousing, 
by adding machine, and by majorities of the moment." 
(Crawford, 5/80:9)
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
While the origins of the contemporary Right lay 
in the conservative reaction to the New Deal alignment 
which began in the mid-1930s, it was the 1964 Goldwater 
presidential campaign which specifically laid the 
groundwork for what was later to be termed the 
"New Right. ’’
The Goldwater campaign served as a training 
ground for New Right activists: it was during Cold-
water’ s campaign that his supporters first conducted a 
large scale campaign to solicit political contributions 
through the mails. Displaying a commitment to right- 
wing ideology and political agenda, rather than the 
Republican Party per se, the New Right leaders learned 
lessons during the Goldwater campaign that they would 
later successfully apply to elections in the 1970s and 
1980. They recognized that Goldwater alienated millions 
of voters by attacking popular New Deal reforms that 
had benefited the middle class as well as the working 
class. And they learned that to win over elements of 
the Democratic coalition, they needed to focus on 
bipartisan single-issue campaigns with a rightist dynamic, 
rather than focusing on "frontal ideological clashes."
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(Davis, 198l:17;36) So , during the 1970s, and continuing 
through the 1980 election, the New Right emphasized 
social and cultural issues, rather than its economic 
program, and enjoyed growing support from constituencies 
mobilized around single-issue campaigns.
The New Right began taking on organizational 
coherence in 1974 when the core of its leadership—  
Viguerie, Weyrich, Phillips and Dolan— laid the organ­
izational foundation for the movement. The New Right 
gained a strong foothold in American politics because it 
was able to give leadership to, and draw together into 
a coalition, the single-issue groups that arose in the 
1970s. In his theory of mobilization, Oberschall (1973) 
writes:
Rapid mobilization does not occur through 
recruitment of large numbers of isolated 
and solitary individuals. It occurs as 
a result of recruiting blocs of people who 
are already highly organized. Many move­
ments result from a sudden merger of a 
number of preexisting associations.
(Oberschall, 1973:12 5)
The New Right rapidly gained political prominence by
1980, not because it "created" a movement, but because
it tapped into and brought together already existing
political groups.
New Right leaders, frustrated with the Old
Right’s lack of a majority strategy, devised a strategy
of "allying ’social conservatives’— blue-collar Democrats
concerned about abortion, busing, and the decline of
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patriotism— with the ’economic conservatives’ of the 
Republican Party." (Judis, 1983:22) And it was 
primarily through the pro-family movement, which brought 
together the constituencies of the anti-abortion, anti­
homosexuality, anti-ERA and pro-school prayer groups, 
that the New Right was able to broaden the conservative 
coalition and draw support from socially conservative 
Democrats. Thus the New Right’s social conservatism 
provided major inroads into traditionally Democratic 
strongholds.
This strategy seemed successful in the 1980 
election when a significant percentage of traditional 
blue-collar Democrats opted for Reagan over Carter. 
However, many of them returned to the Democratic Party 
in 1982, suggesting that while they were susceptible 
to appeals to pro-family social conservatism, economic 
concerns overshadowed other issues when it came time to 
pull the lever. In 1980, these blue-collar Democrats 
were willing to take a chance on Reagan, hoping that 
his economic program would succeed. However, by 1982, 
the economic crisis had deepened. Reagan’s conservative 
policies
did not survive their encounter with 
the realities of global stagflation and 
superpower rivalry. High unemployment, 
persistent inflation, and flagging economic 
growth in the United States were part of 
a world capitalist slump, caused by 
overcapacity in such basic industries as 
steel, textiles, automobiles, and
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petrochemicals. In 1982, rising interest 
rates precipitated a near-depression.
They choked off consumer purchases of 
cars and homes, virtually shutting 
down the automobile and housing 
industries and such related producers 
as timber and steel. High interest 
rates also stimulated an influx of 
foreign currencies, which boosted 
the value of the dollar relative to 
European and Japanese money. The 
overvalued dollar raised the relative 
prices of American exports, causing 
large trade deficits in 1981 and 1982 
despite declining oil imports.
(Judis, 1983:23-24)
And so, in 1982, many Democrats who had defected in 1980, 
returned home to their party. While this ended spec­
ulation that a realignment— in which the country passes 
from one party system to another— had occurred in 1980, 
it did suggest a continuing dealignment of the American 
party structure, where party identification becomes less 
common and less important.
Perhaps because of its seemingly sudden 
appearance on the American political scene, its television 
preachers, and its high-pitched, rabble-rousing style, 
the New Right became a subject of fascination for the 
media. After the 1980 election swept the conservatives 
into office, much of the media echoed the New Right 
leaders’ assessment that the country had taken a sharp 
turn to the right, and that the New Right was largely 
responsible for the conservative victory. After the 
dust settled, and after the 19&2 elections routed 
many Republicans from office, the impact of the New Right
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was reassessed. A second, closer look suggested that 
the strength and impact of the New Right had been 
overstated.
C^While it no longer seems that the New Right is 
on the verge of taking political control of the country, 
as many suggested after the 1980 election, the New Right 
nevertheless must be judged by its own merits as a 
political force in American politicsfj The New Right 
"is an identifiable political reality, which had visible 
success in mobilizing conservative voters and in 
creating an effective organizational machine in recent 
elections." (Petchesky, 1981:207)
In addition to the emergence of the single-issue 
groups in the 1970s, which provided the soil in which 
the New Right was able to take root and flourish, the 
New Right’s success can also be attributed to the, alliance 
between religion and politics. The religious right and 
the secular right established a close working relation­
ship around issues related to the family, sexuality and 
reproduction. By mobilizing religious social 
conservatives, the New Right was able to reach people who 
had never been politically active and people who were 
not economic conservatives. This alliance, which 
organizationally resulted in the pro-family coalition, 
provided a golden opportunity for organizational 
"cross pollination"— leading, for example, to the 
formation of Moral Majority— the largest of the New Right’s
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religious organizations.
As a result of what seemed to be their declining 
political strength,, which was verified by their poor 
showing at the voting booths in 1982, New Right leaders 
began to revise their strategy for gaining a conserv­
ative majority. While social issues afforded the 
New Right inroads into sectors of the population not 
previously identified as right-wing, the 1982 elections 
showed that pro-family coalitions alone could not ensure 
the New Right the formation of the conservative majority 
it longed for. While ideologically the New Right is 
still committed to social conservatism, its leaders are 
political realists. When political expediency requires 
them to do so, they will switch to a new set of issues, 
and employ new tactics to achieve political success. 
Central to the New RightTs new strategy is their 
articulation of a "new populism" politics. The New 
Right hopes to capitalize on the already existing 
populist sentiment in the United States. The New 
Right’s articulation of social conservatism took it a 
long way: it was largely responsible for the New Right’s
rapid rise to political prominence. However, in order 
to maintain its momentum the New Right now has its eye 
on what it considers a large populist constituency waiting 
to be organized. As it did with the single-issue groups 
of the 1970s, the New Right will try to provide leader­
ship and organizational coherence, and thus give
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conservative direction to, the growing populist mood.
It appears quite likely that the New Right will 
remain on the American political scene for some time to 
come, with their power rising and falling as happened
the political process and they know how to scent out 
the issues that can move peopleTj But at present, their 
hopes for achieving a conservative majority do not seem 
realistic. The coalition that the New Right forged 
between economic conservatives and social conservatives 
is a tenuous one. Early in their relationship, the 
social conservatives were lured into the New Right camp 
by the latter1s call for a return to traditional morality 
and allegiance to God, Nation, and Family. The New 
Right articulated the fears and frustrations of the 
constituencies of the socially conservative single-issue 
groups, many of which represented the backlash against 
the sixties readicalism. However, a large number of 
the social conservatives do not support the New RightTs 
economic conservatism. Three years ago, Davis (1981) 
predicted that this conflict would eventually surface:
As long as they enjoy the luxury of 
irresponsible dissent, there isn't 
much reason for the evangelicals and 
the single-issue people to examine all 
the other doctrines of the ideologues 
who pull the strings; until his leaders 
gain some power, the single-issue 
fanatic enjoys the enviable privilege 
of the hedgehog who knows one big thing, 
and the world is a wonderfully simple
during 19 80 skilled at using
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place. But Weyrlch and the others 
happen to have a lot of funny ideas 
about a lot of subjects. They are 
not great fans of the social legislation 
that sustains them in hard times, 
illness, and old age— the common soldiery 
of the New Right many be devoted to 
single issues, but the New Right's 
leadership most definitely is not.
Faith and morals are one thing; fooling 
around with a man's paycheck is 
another. The New Right has some 
interesting plans for its followers, 
which its followers aren't going to 
like. (Davis, 1981:26)
Oberschall writes that in order to sustain 
resistance or protest, "an organizational base and 
continuity in leadership are necessary." (Oberschall, 
1973:119) The New Right has a strong organizational 
base, and it has demonstrated its skillfulness at 
networking and coalition-building. Viguerie, Dolan, 
Weyrich and Phillips continue to provide strong leader­
ship for the New Right. Although the leadership's 
dream of forging a conservative majority which will 
take control of the nation's political processes does 
not, at present, seem likely to be realized, the New 
Right nevertheless, still represents a strong political 
force in American politics.
While both liberal Sociology and Marxist theory 
have contributed to the understanding of American 
conservatism and the rise of right-wing movements, 
neither was prepared for, nor could adequately explain, 
the political success of the New Right in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s. In 1963 Richard Rovere said that
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the radical right organizations symbolize "frantic efforts 
to prevent ultraconservatism from dying out." (Bell, 
1963:32-33) And Seymour Martin Lipset predicted that 
"it is extremely doubtful that the radical right will 
grow beyond the peak of 1953-53." (Lipset, 1963:29) 
Although it was through its study of the radical right 
that modern political sociology grew to maturity, the 
sociologists who studied the right in the 1950s and 
1960s nevertheless failed to develop an analysis of 
right-wing movements that could adequately explain the 
success of the current New Right movement. (Wolfe, 1981:4) 
In 1955* The New American Right was published; 
its contributors included Daniel Bell, Talcott Parsons, 
Richard Hofstadter and Seymour Martin Lipset. These 
essays were later updated and republished as The Radical 
Right in 1963* with new essays by the original authors 
as well as contributions by new authors. These essays 
were among the first "significant attempts to understand 
the American right with the tools of modern social 
science." (Wolfe, 1981:7)
The authors of The Radical Right felt that postwar 
American prosperity was the root condition for conserv­
ative sentiment. While depressions and unemployment 
generally inspire left-wing protest, prosperity, 
especially if accompanied by inflation, generates 
right-wing protest. "Prosperity", Bell argued, "brings 
in its wake new social groups, new social strains, and
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new social anxieties." (Bell, 1963:^7) The radical right 
were the "dispossessed"— those groups who were left 
behind by modernism, one of the main products of 
prosperity. The politics of the radical right, he 
said, were the politics of frustration, "the sour 
impotence of those who find themselves unable to under­
stand, let alone command, the complex mass society that 
is the polity today." (Bell, 1963:31)
The contributors to The Radical Right downplayed 
class as an explanation for conservative sentiment, and 
instead elevated the concept of status politics.
This concept held that factors such as declining prestige 
and status frustrations were responsible for right-wing 
movements, more so than were economic factors. Status 
politics "arise during periods of prosperity, especially 
when full employment is accompanied by inflation, and 
when many individuals are able to improve their economic 
position." (Lipset, 1963:260) Groups that are receptive 
to status-oriented appeals include
those groups already possessing status 
who feel that the rapid social change 
threatens their own claims to high 
social position, or enables previously 
lower status groups to claim equal 
status with their own. (Lipset, 1963:260)
The New Right's success in times of economic
difficulty challenges the prosperity hypothesis.
While inflation in the 1980s has, as Bell predicted,
spurred right-wing activism, so too has high levels of
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unemployment. "If anything, the right has become 
stronger in an era of limited prosperity and slow growth." 
(Wolfe, 1981:9) And while status politics helps to 
explain the appeal of the New Right to those sectors 
of the population— primarily "middle America"— who felt 
bypassed and put down by the changes brought about by the 
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it alone is 
inadequate in explaining the rise of the right. While 
the concept of status politics was an important 
sociological contribution, the fact that Hofstadter and 
Lipset emphasized it almost to the exclusion of class, 
weakened it. For example, the tax revolt in California, 
as represented by Proposition 13* was led by the right 
and played a significant part in the New Right's success. 
However, status politics cannot account for the tax 
revolt.
One can develop all kinds of theories 
about opposition to taxes, but none of 
them are more compelling than the fact 
that lower taxes mean higher personal 
income, and in a time of economic 
trouble, direct gains in personal income 
are more easily chosen over indirect 
ones in public service. Surely the 
popular vote for Proposition 13 in 
California was due more to an economic 
squeeze than a massive decline in status 
on the part of 60% of the state's 
voting population. (Wolfe, 1981:12-13)
Where the liberal sociologists tended to neglect
class politics, Marxist theory emphasizes it. But
Marxist theory also demonstrates weaknesses in analyzing
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the right. Marxist theory of the state holds that 
ideology speaks for interest, and yet the New Right 
asserts its ideology even when it is not in its interest 
to do so. "In America... the most ideological segment 
of the political universe is the right wing, and a 
theory that conflates ideology and interest will miss 
much of its significance." (Wolfe, 1981:15)
Both Marxist theory and liberal Sociology could 
not account for the primacy of family and sexual issues 
to the New Right's political program. Petchesky argues 
that "what has given the New Right both ideological 
legitimacy and organizational coherence in this period 
has been its focus on reproductive and sexual issues." 
(Petchesky, 1981:207) And yet both the Marxist and 
liberal disciplines have been "uncomfortable" with these 
issues, often relegating them to the sidelines. And so 
it was not until the development of feminist theory in 
the 1970s that the radical critique of right-wing 
movements began to understand the centrality of these 
concerns. (Wolfe, 1981:l4)
By opening up for political analysis and exam­
ination such areas as the family, sex roles, reproduction, 
etc., feminists had extended their critique into areas 
unacknowledged as "political." Feminism asked questions 
that had been declared as "nonquestions."
...if feminist theory has contributed 
any insight to an understanding of 
modern capitalist society, it is in
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having revealed the illusion of a 
split between a 'private1 and a 
'public' world that bourgeois 
culture embodies. Feminism penetrates 
this boundary between 'public' and 
'private,' revealing for political 
 ^scrutiny the realms of life that 
bourgeois society had consigned to 
a sacred 'privacy'— marriage, the 
family, childrearing, maternity; sex, 
of whatever variety; personal,
'private' relations, especially 
between women and men, wherever they 
occur. Feminism calls forth all 
these unspoken, personal relations 
and renames them as political 
questions, questions of power and 
social determination. Earlier, Marxism 
had illuminated the social character 
of 'private property'— capital, labor 
power, ground rent— was a personal 
attribute. But feminism goes further 
to the root of the problem because it 
demystifies the category of privacy 
itself. (Petchesky, 1981:223)
Much of the New Right's success in building a
popular base of support has been through its mobilization
of sentiments concerned with family and cultural issues.
The centrality of the politics of family, sexuality,
and reproduction to the New Right's rise to power bears
out feminist theory's assertion of the political nature
of these issues.
What feminists for generations have been 
urging— that issues related to the 
family, sexuality, and reproduction are 
political at their roots, that they ramify 
on every level of public and social life—  
has been squarely brought home to 
everyone by the staunches foes of feminism. 
(Petchesky, 1981:209)
Feminist theory can help "clarify and critique 
the dominant mode of discourse, the dominant ideology
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of legitimation, that an ascendant conservatism has 
adopted." (Petchesky, 1981:223) That ideology of 
legitimation for the New Right is "privatism." The 
right-wing attacks on abortion constitute a reconcept­
ualization of what is private and what is public. The 
New Right has used antiabortion politics to reassert its 
view of privacy; but, as Petchesky points out, privacy 
for the New Right becomes a corporate attribute. It is 
privacy for corporate bodies— such as business, the 
patriarchal family, the church and school— that is 
intended, not individual privacy.
There has been a tendency, by those who study 
right-wing movements, to downgrade the rationality of 
the Right and to view it in a condescending fashion. 
Hofstadter's statement that the "pseudo-conservative 
tends to be more than ordinarily incoherent about politics" 
is an illustration of this attitude." (Hofstadter,
1963:77) This attitude holds the risk of failing to 
take seriously the political impact of right-wing 
movements as well as the material conditions and political 
climate that produce them.
Petchesky notes that while the language and 
symbolism of the New Right "often take a mystical and 
irrational form, their ends are nevertheless coherent 
and clear." (Petchesky, 1981:23*0 The New Right's 
pro-family movement, she maintains, should not be written
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off as mere opportunism or religious fanaticism. It has
achieved a measure of national political power as well
as popular support because "it is in fact a response
to real material conditions and deeplying fears, a
response that is utterly reactionary, but nevertheless
attune." (Petchesky, 1981:236-237) The political values
and social changes that the New Right's pro-family
movement are fighting against are real and pervasive.
Both the women's and gay liberation 
movements, on the one hand, and the 
structural changes in the family that 
have been both cause and effect of these 
movements, represent a genuine threat 
to the type of family system and the 
sexual morality that the New Right is 
seeking to preserve. (Petchesky,
1981:23*0
Right-wing movements are backlash movements and
the New Right is reacting against, and trying to turn
back the tide of, the changes brought about by the
social movements and liberal social policies of the
1960s and 1970s.
The loss of control that the people in 
the New Right feel is real. Changes in 
state and society have deprived the 
elements of the middle strata of certain 
forms of control they had previously 
had over their social, economic, 
and cultural milieu. The changes in 
the organization of capitalism, the 
increased role of the state in regulating 
economic and social and cultural relations, 
the 1960s movements of minorities, women, 
students and cultural radicals, the 
threats world-wide from allies as well 
as foes to US hegemony— all these have 
been experienced as threats to the solid 
middle of America. (Hunter, 1981:135)
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It was through the study of radical right movements 
in the 1950s and early 1960s that important and enduring 
contributions in Sociology were made. However, the New 
Right's success in setting the agenda for political 
discourse in the late 1970s and early 1980s has pointed 
to weaknesses (as well as strengths) in Sociology's 
understanding of the dynamics of the radical Right. Where 
liberal Sociology and Marxist theory have been weak 
in analyzing the family and sexual politics of the New 
Right, feminist theory has been strong, and has made 
important contributions in this area. The current 
resurgence in right-wing sentiment and activism has 
both rekindled interest in, and demonstrated the need 
for, continued sociological examination of the radical 
Right.
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